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THE CHALLENGE 
What is being abolished is 41 autonomous man — the 
inner man. . . His abolition I has long been overdue. Au­
tonomous man is a device • used to explain what we 
cannot explain in any other way. He has been constructed from 
our ignorance, (p. 191) 
A scientific view of man offers exciting possibilities. We 
have not yet seen what man can make of man. (p. 206) 
The above words were penned by the distinguished psychol­
ogist B. F. Skinner (1971), who is considered by many to be the most 
important psychologist of this century. He is today's leading 
spokesman for behaviorism and the champion behind psycho­
logical engineering. His operant conditioning theory has produced 
noticeable changes in American education, counseling, and busi­
ness management. Time magazine (Sept. 20, 1971) called Skinner, 
"the most influential of living American psychologists, and the most 
controversial contemporary figure in the science of human be­
havior, adored as a messiah and abhorred as a menace' (p. 47). 
Skinner is a continual focus of debate because he is firmly 
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committed to the propositions that human nature can be completely 
understood through the methods of natural science; that human 
behavior is determined by the environment; and that the psycho­
logical control of human behavior is the only hope for the immense 
problems facing mankind in the twentieth century. These ideas, 
however, cut against the grain of much of the philosophical and 
theological thought of the last twenty-five hundred years and have 
caused many to raise cries of alarm or serious philosophical ques­
tions about their adequacy. Francis Schaeffer (1972), for example, 
writes: 
We are on the verge of the largest revolution the world has ever 
seen—the control and shaping of men through genetic en­
gineering and chemical and psychological conditioning. Will 
people accept it? I don't think they would accept it if (1) they had 
not already been taught to accept the presuppositions that lead to 
it and (2) they were not in such despair. But many have accepted 
the presuppositions and they are in despair, (pp. 35, 44) 
M.my others have apprehensively seen in Skinner's work the pro­
phetic shades of 1984, Brave New World, or A Clockwork Orange, 
with their images of dictatorial controllers with advanced academic 
degrees in behavioristic psychology (obviously). 
Skinner, on the other hand, sees his ideas as the solid product 
of years of careful scientific research. He feels that his research and 
writings on behaviorism have sufficiently countered the inept 
theologies and literatures of freedom and dignity. In his opinion 
behaviorism ts the only area of psychology worth studying today. As 
he stated in an interview with Psychology Today (Hall, 1967): 
I think we have put our finger on something of extraordinary 
mportance here—and when we get the truth out, everything will 
' fu'es which we have seen and are still 
A , 'n8t. " ,^?rn one cannot make a very serious mistake. 
worth the telling futUre °f Psychol°8V lies- ** well 
ifw. L£*JM ,r°m correct when he assesses the importance of 
that dS pffX^uce^- While he may be extreme in his view 
that behaviorism contains most of the truth worth telling in 
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psychology, Skinner has had such a great impact on our society that 
no educated person should be ignorant of his theories. 
Skinner began his research in the 1930's studying the condi­
tioning of rats and other animals in highly controlled experimental 
chambers. Since that time his basic research methods and ideas 
have been used to speed up animal learning, improve patient be­
havior in psychiatric wards, cure problems like bed wetting and 
stuttering, eliminate disruptive or delinquent behaviors, improve 
human learning ability and speed, develop self-control of unwanted 
habits, and more. Skinner's inventive flair captured popular atten­
tion when he unveiled such behavioristic offerings as teaching 
machines, pigeons that played ping pong, and scientifically de­
signed baby cribs. His work has also spawned a host of successful 
graduate students and spurred the proliferation of new journals de­
voted to behavioristic topics.' 
It has not been only on the lofty scientific level that Skinner's 
influence has been felt, but on the popular level as well. Who of us 
has not heard parents state in Skinner's own language that they 
hesitated to rush to their crying baby's crib lest they "reinforce" its 
crying behavior? Everyone who takes an introductory psychology 
class comes away thinking a little more like a behaviorist. It has 
become increasingly obvious that Skinner's behaviorism is an im­
portant part of the fabric of our thinking and our daily lives. Because 
of this great influence and the fact that Skinner's behavior control 
applications are being proposed for the large-scale management of 
society, it is of utmost importance for us to critically examine and 
count the cost of the behaviorism we are being sold. 
FIVE CHALLENGES There are five aspects of Skinner's be­
haviorism that challenge traditional ways of 
looking at life. These areas challenge assumptions of the academic 
'The following list of journals and their founding dates chronicles the growth of 
behavioristic research as Skinner's theories became increasingly more accepted by 
the scientific community, loumal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (1958); 
Behavior Research and Therapy (1962); The loumal of Applied Behavior Analysis 
(1968), Behavior Therapy (1970); Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 
(1970); loumal of Behavior Technology (1971). 
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community and society at large and therefore demand our careful 
examination. This book will attempt to bring these challenges into 
focus. 
The Challenge To Human Dignity 
The data and theories of Skinner have been used to challenge 
the traditional view that human nature is something intangible and 
free. While Skinner is a descendant of a long line of academic 
scientists who have challenged such lofty views of man, and while 
he made his views quite clear in earlier writings, it was not until his 
Beyond Freedom and Dignity filled the book racks in 1971 that his 
mechanistic views on human nature became widely known and 
debated. Skinner was of the opinion that, for too long the truth 
about the control of human nature by environment had been hidden 
in technical jargon and the data graphs of behavioristic journals. 
Therefore, in 1971, the challenge was delivered to the public. 
The Challenge To Human Freedom 
Skinner's challenge to the traditional concept of human free­
dom and responsibility deserves careful examination and critique 
for two reasons. First, since scientists believe less and less in the 
freedom and dignity of man, their applications and technologies 
could begin to treat man with less humaneness and dignity. Histori­
cally, when a segment of the population has been considered to be 
less than human technically (e.g., the mentally disturbed, the 
human fetus, a minority group), that segment has been treated with 
less humaneness practically. 
Second, as the prevailing lofty view of human nature and free­
dom declines, even if that view is correct, individuals in society can 
begin to lose the awareness of their own freedom and the confi­
dence in their own ability to resist environmental influences. The 
concept of self-fulfilling prophecy predicts that if science leads us to 
believe that everything we do is caused by our genes and our envi­
ronments, we will begin to lose the ability to direct our own futures. 
Our society would become more passive, and educators, therapists, 
and jurists would be less and less inclined to view individuals as 
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responsible—even for criminal behaviors. Even if Skinner's theories 
on determinism are not true, human nature is still in danger of 
becoming a piece of the environment by default. This is part of what 
C. S. Lewis (1947) meant when he wrote: 
It is in Man's power to treat himself as a mere 'natural objecf and 
his own judgements of value as raw material for scientific mani­
pulation to alter at will. The objection to his doing so does not lie 
in the fact that his point of view (like one's first day in a dissecting 
room) is painful and shocking till we grow used to it. The pain and 
shock are at most a warning and a symptom. The real objection is 
that if man chooses to treat himself as raw material, raw material 
he will be; not raw material to be manipulated, as he fondly 
imagined by himself, but by mere appetite, that is mere Nature, in 
the person of his dehumanized Conditioners, (p. 84) 
The Challenge To Value 
Skinner's behaviorism and its accompanying technology also 
raise a major challenge in the area of values. There is no doubt that 
the science of behaviorism has been sufficiently developed to permit 
its use in individual settings and for small-scale social control. Even 
this limited usage raises serious questions ofvalues and ethics and the 
possibility of wide-spread social control raises questions that can 
challenge the very foundations of the ethical values of our society. 
Skinner suggests a general value structure that can guide be­
havioral technology and ultimately address questions like, What is 
the optimum in human personality and behavior that these 
technologies are attempting to produce? What restrictions guide the 
use of punishment? and Is the group to be valued over the indi­
vidual? How are we to respond to his proposed directions and does 
his naturalistic philosophy provide an adequate basis for answering 
the tough ethical questions science and technology are raising? This 
challenge is also posed by the other natural and social sciences and 
it is a crucial one. 
The Challenge To Philosophy 
A fourth challenge set forth by Skinner is a philosophical one. 
Skinner claims that when anyone criticizes his views, the argument 
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is not with him, but with well-demonstrated, scientific facts. By 
suggesting that his critics, with all of their high-sounding philo­
sophical criticism, have failed to understand the science behind his 
psychological theory, Skinner essentially attempts to wipe out all 
competing philosophical views. Considering the credibility our 
culture has given to science, this challenge has been effective for 
Skinner in some quarters. 
To face this challenge Skinner's critics point out that a particu­
lar scientific enterprise is only as sound as its philosophical as­
sumptions. They suggest that Skinner is not speaking as much from 
laboratory data about human nature and human freedom as he is 
from prior assumptions regarding materialism, empiricism, deter­
minism, and the nature of acceptable data in psychology. Skinner's 
science needs to be examined in the light of these assumptions to 
see what in his theory is a product of his science and what is a 
product of his assumptions. 
The Challenge To Human Problems 
A final challenge posed by Skinner is his willingness to apply 
his scientific theory to even very difficult human problems. One 
cannot listen to or read Skinner without sensing his concern for 
human beings and the future of the human race. Since he believes 
the problems of war, pullution, crime, and emotional illness can be 
solved by his technology, he is challenging all alternative views for 
social change. Included in this challenge is a questioning of the 
entire Judeo-Christian view of human nature and the potential for 
the Gospel of Jesus Christ to change human nature and to heal 
personal and social problems. In many ways the Christian scientist 
should be challenged by Skinner's last words in Beyond Freedom 
and Dignity. "A scientific view of man offers exciting possibilities. 
We have not yet seen what man can make of man" (p. 206). 
SKINNER'S Si nee, for Skinner's behav-
"ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY" iorism, the environment is seen 
as the controller of a person's 
behavior, it seems appropriate to consider Skinner's environmental 
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FIGURE 1 
'B. F. Skinner" photo courtesy of B. F. Skinner 
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history with an eye to its "influences" on Skinner. Skinner is one of 
the more interesting psychologists of our time. It took an unusual 
individual to sculpt from dull learning theories such things as pi­
geons that fly missiles and a well-written novel about a behaviorally 
engineered community. He is also a man who saw fit to live within 
at least some of his own ideas. His younger daughter spent most of 
the first thirty months of her life in an air crib, a large box with 
climate control. He even charts his own productive hours in his 
office in the same way that he charts the behaviors of his animals! 
Skinner was raised in rather ordinary family, academic, and 
religious surroundings. His Bible training, which he describes as 
"liberal," did not foster in him a belief in the supernatural. In fact, 
early in his teens he announced to one of his teachers that he no 
longer believed in God; he has not regained that belief. How much 
his atheism affected his later beliefs on reality, man, and ethics is 
difficult to determine, but that assumption must be recognized as an 
environmental factor. 
Skinner graduated from college with a major in English and 
what might be called a minor in fun-loving pranks. His literary 
abilities had been appraised when he was still a senior in college by 
Robert Frost, who wrote him encouraging comments. After gradua­
tion Skinner went to Greenwich Village and spent six months as a 
writer. He felt he was a failure at writing, because he had nothing to 
say, and he began to wonder if the literary method was as effective 
as science in changing things. 
Skinner s interest in psychology was strengthened by his read­
ing of Pavlov's Conditioned Reflexes (1927), Bertrand Russell's 
losophy (1925), which devoted a lot of time to John Watson's 
e aviorism (1924—25) and Watson's book. After this time period 
Skinner enrolled in Harvard for graduate study in psychology. 
ter graduate work under Edwin Boring and postdoctoral re­
search at Harvard, Skinner went to the University of Minnesota. 
JT ,6 taught for the first time, lecturing to large introductory 
wnnlrl i°f^ s^ectlons' Since he was teaching from material that 
(19581 ec°me ^'s ^'rst book, The Behavior of Organisms 
e wonders whether his students were aware that they 
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were hearing a legend-to-be speaking on ideas that were soon to 
dominate the entire field of psychology. It was also at this time that 
he began work on Verbal Behavior (1957) that was to take over 
twenty years to complete. 
During World War II Skinner undertook two of his more fa­
mous projects. He began "Project Pigeon" when he worked with 
the office of Scientific Research and Development. He taught pi­
geons to operate the guidance system of the Pelican missile. Al­
though they performed excellently, his Kamikaze pigeons saw no 
active combat. Near the end of the war Skinner and his wife had 
another child, Deborah. In order to make these infant years easier 
on parents and child, he mechanized child care with his air crib. It 
was basically a large glass box with temperature control and sliding 
glass doors. He later wrote an article on this for the Ladies Home 
Journal. 
During seven weeks of the summer of 1945 Skinner wrote 
Walden Two (1948), his Utopian novel about a behaviorally con­
trolled community. At the time he seriously considered beginning 
such a community (Skinner, 1967). 
At one time I seriously considered an actual experiment. I could 
be one of the most dramatic adventurers in the twentiety century. 
It needs a younger man, however, and I am unwilling to give up 
the opportunity to do other things which in the long run may well 
advance the principles of Walden Two more rapidly, (p. 404) 
In the fall of 1945 Skinner became the department chairman at 
Indiana University. In addition to administration he ran some 
experiments on pigeons and helped to found the Journal of the 
Experimental Analysis of Behavior and Division 25 of the American 
Psychological Association. Finally, in 1948 Skinner joined the De­
partment of Psychology at Harvard where he conducted research 
and taught courses in human behavior. In the 1950's when his 
daughters were in school he took an interest in the educational 
process and this led to his development of the teaching machine. By 
1958 Skinner's work had been so well received that he was honored 
with the American Psychological Association's Distinguished Sci­
entific Contribution Award. 
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FIGURE 2 
y <* oox pnoto courtesy 
. ou.8^now In his seventies, Skinner continues to write ar 
mnf rionr LC v!nterVieWS' N°W' 35 in the Past' he is supreme 
he slidthat V ^ POt V6ry tolerant of his critics' At one tirT 
Verbal Beha '' 'h 3 t6W P38eS °f Chomsky's Review i 
and r^soH r ' I elt?3t Ch°msky had missed the whole poir 
that ^0? h° fUrther (Ha"' 1%7)- Likewise' * is doubtf 
theory as ca hreCent Cm?S ^ Changed his Confidence in h y as can be seen in this quote (1967): 
THE CHALLENGE • 19 
Behaviorism is a formulation which makes possible an effective 
experimental approach to human behavior. It is a working 
hypothesis about the nature of a subject matter. It may be 
clarified, but it does not need to be argued. I have no doubt of the 
eventual triumph of the position—not that it will eventually be 
proved right, but that it would provide the most direct route to a 
successful science of man. (pp. 409-10) 
THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK This analysis of Skinner's behav­
iorism will begin with a look at the 
philosophical and scientific foundations on which the theory is 
built. Chapter 2 examines the philosophical assumptions from 
which Skinner operates as a scientist and includes a look at Skin­
ner's view of the person, development, and psychopathology. 
Chapter 3 reviews the specifics of Skinner's operant conditioning 
theory. 
Chapters 4-7 contain a critique of Skinner's behaviorism; 
chapter 4 examines problems with the scientific basis for Skinner's 
behaviorism by asking the question, Does the laboratory data sup­
port the radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner? Chapter 5 looks at 
Skinner's explanation for human mental states to see if it is satisfac­
tory in the face of rationalistic data. Chapter 6 examines the prob­
lems with Skinner's view of complete determinism. And Chapter 7 
discusses the difficulty Skinner's behaviorism has with deriving 
value and giving direction to the proposed behavioral technology. 
Many times in class, when I have been critiquing another sci­
entist's position on an issue, my students have asked, What would 
so and so say to that objection, if he were here? It seems to me that it 
would be fair to give Skinner a chance to respond to his critics; 
Chapter 8, therefore, examines some of the more common objec­
tions to Skinner's behaviorism by providing answers from Skinner s 
own writings. Chapter 9 concludes with a look at the relationship of 




No science is conducted in a totally objective and unbiased 
fashion. Scientific data col- lection and theory generation 
are profoundly affected by the •• assumptions the scientist 
brings into the laboratory. In fact, even the scientist's choice of a 
laboratory is based on these prior assumptions! These assumptions 
are part of a scientist's paradigm, or world view. Since the appear­
ance of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962), scientists have been keenly aware of the effect of their 
philosophical assumptions on their scientific activities. In an earlier 
work (Cosgrove, 1979) I attempted to show that the theories of 
human nature and human problems in psychology are as much a 
product of the psychological world view under which a psychol­
ogist operates as is the research done in the laboratory. Assumptions 
about the nature of reality, the nature of man, and the nature of 
knowledge impact our views of the nature of the problems facing 
humanity. 
The manner in which prior assumptions affect scientific activ­
ities can be divided into three categories. First, one's assumptions 
21 
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affect the subject matter one chooses to study. A psychologist who 
believes that man is only material will have a greater interest in 
studying human brains than haunted houses. A psychologist who 
believes in organic evolution should have a greater interest in com­
parative psychology than one who does not. Second, a scientist's 
assumptions affect what methods are chosen for use in the labora­
tory, and these methods directly affect what is discovered. For 
example, a psychologist who does not believe that human mental 
phenomena are of any consequence is more comfortable observing 
only the behavior of subjects. This results, however, in limiting our 
knowledge of humans to behaviors instead of (or in addition to) 
thoughts and feelings. Third, prior assumptions can affect one's 
interpretation of the data collected in the laboratory. A scientist who 
believes in an orderly cause-effect universe is more likely to inter­
pret an ESP mind-reading experiment as subliminal perception than 
as extrasensory perception. Because of beliefs about reality, the 
scientist is predisposed to look for natural, regular causes that ac­
count for the observations. 
SKINNER S in analyzing Skinner's theoretical perspec-
ACADEMIC ROOTS tives it is important to begin with his general 
assumptions as a scientist and a psychologist 
since these assumptions play a great role in his brand of be­
haviorism. It has been said that osvrhnlnav hac a ch^rt h,,t a 
Empiricism and Associationism 
latprl p^terms emP'nc'sm and associationism are integrally re-
• piricism refers to the sensorv "writine" nn thp hlank clatP 
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or stimulus inputs are associated with each other. The basic princi­
ple of association is contiguity—two experiences occurring closely 
together in time are likely to be associated. Stimuli may also be 
associated with behavioral or biological responses, and these 




The "mind" is composed of 
S-R (stimulus-response) 
associations. Ideas are 
merely raw copies of sense 
data. 
Rationalism 
The mind interacts with and 
reflects on sense data. The 
question is not whether sen­
sory experience modifies 
ideas but to what extent it 
modifies them. 
A comparison of empirical and rationalistic models of knowledge and 
the person. 
24 • B. F. SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM 
If empiricism means that all knowledge comes from the senses, 
then how do I know that this object in my hand is a pen? What is 
needed is a kind of mental glue to hold together all the stimulus 
sensations capable of being experienced from this object. Associa-
tionism is the glue. Stimuli and responses that occur closely together 
in time often enough become associated, such that one stimulus 
alone can cause the memory of the rest. Thus, to an empiricist, the 
operations of the mind, or the nature of the person, are understood 
by studying S-R relationships. It was with this emphasis that experi­
mental psychology began and while Skinner does not consider him­
self an S-R psychologist, his empiricism lends itself to theories of 
learning quite similar to S-R psychology. 
Pavlov and Watson 
Association as a psychological principle was built into the re­
search of both Ivan Pavlov and John B. Watson. Association ism also 
affected the more contemporary figures D. O. Hebb, whose cell 
assembly theory was an associationistic metaphor, and B. F. Skin­
ner, whose operant conditioning theory emphasizes the association 
between behavior and reinforcing stimuli. Pavlov, the Nobel 
Prize-winning Russian physiologist, considered that the basis of 
associations is structural, and that repeated experiences somehow 
alter the structural features of activated neural elements. With his 
now famous classical conditioning experiments, Pavlov tried to 
show that not only were inborn reflexes a part of the behavior of 
organisms, but learned reflexes (associations) were also. These 
earned reflexes were formed when neutral stimuli were associated 
with natural stimulus-response reflexes. The neutral stimuli soon 
were able to elicit the reflexive responses. As a materialist and a 
mechanist, Pavlov was asking the question, Is it not possible that all 
e avior an even mind" itself are just the combination of 
p ysio ogica re exes? According to Pavlov, his experiments with 
dogs and salivation and the letters cs, ucs, CR, and UCR must have just 
now re exive y entered your awareness as I discussed his work. 
3 S0^ wais su ficientlY influenced by Pavlov's work to use the 
lone re ex as a basic building block for the theoretical con-
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struction of behavior. As the father of American psychology, Wat­
son virtually guaranteed that psychology would take an empirical, 
associational direction. According to Watson, the only subject 
matter for psychology was behavior, since behavior could be ob­
served. Watson cast aside terms like will, mind, awareness, desire, 
and idea; they were of no interest to psychology, since they could 
not be studied scientifically. Since Watson's behavioristic alterna­
tive is closely related to his empirical, associationistic foundations, 
we often use the term behaviorist for any psychologist who takes an 
empirical, mechanistic view of human nature. Actually, most psy­
chologists consider themselves behaviorists in that they recognize 
the scientific advantages of using behavior as data; not all are radi­
cal behaviorists, however, since they believe in the mind, not sim­
ply as a complex stimulus-response structure, but as an innate prop­
erty of a person. Thus Watson and Skinner are best considered to be 
"radical behaviorists." This term will be elaborated later. 
Skinner's Inheritance 
Although Skinner follows in the general direction of Pavlov and 
Watson, he does not accept classical conditioning as a paradigm of 
association learning. He accepts instead operant conditioning. This 
means that while he accepts the empirical, associationistic model of 
learning, he rejects the reflex learning of Pavlov, where responses 
are elicited by stimuli, in favor of instrumental learning, where the 
organism emits a response apparently at "will." Skinner's psychol­
ogy, therefore, has less mechanical flavor to it than Watson's, even 
though he sees the organism as nonetheless determined. 
Skinner also differs from the simple S-R psychology of Watson. 
He has incorporated E. L. Thorndike's law of effect into his theory. 
Thorndike felt that for most behavior there was no triggering 
stimulus that automatically produced behavior, but that behavior 
was influenced primarily by the expected consequences of that 
behavior. In other words, acts that have favorable consequences 
will recur. Skinner has added reinforcement as the critical stimulus 
element in any potential S-R relationships. Since it is reinforcement 
that follows behavior that becomes effective in causing that be-
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havior to recur, Skinner's S-R theory might be written S1-R-S2 where 
S2 is the stimulus reinforcement. 
Since Watson wanted to reduce man to his physiological con­
structs and classical conditioning, reflex learning theory gave the 
impression that he denied the importance of the mind and viewed 
men as machines. This is not so with Skinner. He is content to 
reduce man to molar behavior (bar pressing, running, etc.) and 
admits to the operation of a mind, but insists that such a mind is 
formed by the same S-R-S associations that structure behavior. 
Therefore, Skinner's "person" turns out to be a machine that does 
not appear mechanized. 
What Skinner does accept from his academic ancestors is as 
important as what he rejects. He accepts the empirical, associa-
tionistic model of man, with reinforcement as the essential stimulus 
ingredient in learning. With Watson, he denies the existence of the 
free, independent mind or soul, and accepts a description of be­
havior as the complete description of a person. Therefore, B. F. 
Skinner is very much a part of the S-R, behavioristic tradition in the 
United States, and is, in fact, its leading spokesman. 
SKINNER'S We are now prepared to examine more 
MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS closely the assumptions that have shaped 
the nature of Skinner's theories and 
ideas. These assumptions involve three areas: reality, the human 
person, and the path to knowledge. 
Naturalism and Materialism in Reality 
While psychologists do not usually find it important to discuss 
their assumptions about the ultimate nature of reality, it is not hard 
to discern Skinner's beliefs. He participates in the western world's 
secu ar, scientific mentality. His current writings indicate an 
aca emic impatience toward religious beliefs; in earlier writings 
, "7 'nd'cated that he was an a^eist (1967). All of this suggests 
3 6 u° i.S !° ^ natura''stic, materialistic picture of reality. This 
means t at e elieves that the universe is composed of only matter 
energy, rea ity does not include God, demons, souls, or other 
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nonmaterial elements. This universe, according to naturalists, is a 
closed system in which every effect must have a material cause. 
The importance of Skinner's naturalistic and materialistic as­
sumptions is that they greatly limit the kinds of assumptions he can 
hold concerning the human mind and knowledge. If the universe is 
mere matter, then so is man; the human mind is only a by-product 
of functioning matter. If matter is ruled by laws of cause and effect, 
then man, who is only matter, must behave in a completely deter­
mined way. If the universe is only material, then Skinner can place 
great confidence in knowledge by empiricism, since there is noth­
ing out there that is not potentially within the grasp of sensory 
experience. 
Given Skinner's naturalistic, materialistic picture of reality, he 
is almost bound by consistency to believe that man is only matter, 
completely determined, and that scientific methods can reveal all 
truth about human nature. Notice that data in the laboratory have 
not convinced Skinner of these behavioristic views. He adheres to 
behaviorism first and foremost because of his materialistic and 
naturalistic assumptions. 
Empiricism and Materialism in Man 
Though Skinner believes in the material nature of the human 
being, (as opposed to the dualism of mind and body), he does not 
deny the existence of inner feelings, sensations, or thoughts. He 
seeks instead to clarify the nature of these functions. To Skinner 
these mental states are a product of environmental conditioning. He 
has said (1953): 
The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that 
they are not relevant in a functional analysis. . . . The external 
variables of which behavior is a function provide for what may 
be called a causal or functional analysis, (p. 35) 
Skinner believes that almost all behavior and what we call "person-
hood" is learned by the build-up of associations. As an empiricist, 
then, he is saying that personality is a product of environmental 
conditioning plus some relatively minor genetic predisposition. To 
Skinner, personality theory is just a branch of learning theory. 
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The following quotes from Skinner further reflect his mate­
rialistic view of the person: 
The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a 
body with a person inside, but of a body which is a person in the 
sense that it displays a complex repertoire of behavior. (1971, 
p. 190) 
A person is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a point at 
which many genetic and environmental conditions come to­
gether in a joint effect. (1974, p. 185) 
A behavioristic analysis rests on the following assumption: A 
person is first of all an organism, a member of a species and a 
subspecies, possessing a genetic endowment of anatomical and 
physiological characteristics, which are the product of con­
tingencies of survival to which the species has been exposed in 
the process of evolution. The organism becomes a person as it 
acquires a repertoire of behavior under the contingencies of 
reinforcement to which it is exposed during its lifetime. The be­
havior it exhibits at any one moment is under the control of a 
current setting. (1974, p. 228) 
Though Skinner believes in the existence of internal mental states 
and accepts some genetic influence over the behavior of an indi­
vidual, he works from a strongly empirical, materialistic perspective 
of human nature. 
Determinism in Man 
Skinner believes that human behavior is basically environ­
mentally determined. He believes that the same regularity that de­
scribes the physical world will also describe man. The laws de-
M rihing human behavior are to be found in environmental factors. 
\\ bile Skinner admits that the research scientist is still in no position 
to 4,ite unequivocally that man is completely determined by his 
environment, he believes this is a worthwhile scientific assumption 
' at future scientific findings will continue to validate. 
(Observe Skinner's own words: 
The uork is mechanistic in the sense of implying a fundamental 
awtu ness or order in the behavior of organisms . . . but it is 
•issu'ii that behavior is predictable from a knowledge of rele-
' . <>s anc' 's ^ree from the intervention of any capricious 
agent. (1938, p. 433) 
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When all relevant variables have been arranged, an or­
ganism will or will not respond. If it does not, it cannot. If it can, 
it will. To ask whether someone can turn a handspring is merely 
to ask whether there are circumstances under which he will do 
so. (1953, p. 112) 
Personal exemption from a complete determinism is re­
voked as a scientific analysis progresses, particularly in ac­
counting for the behavior of the individual. (1971, p. 18) 
It is in the nature of an experimental analysis of human 
behavior that it should strip away the functions previously as­
signed to autonomous man and transfer them one by one to the 
controlling environment. (1971, p. 189) 
While Skinner does not accept the mechanistic, reflex-learning 
model of Pavlov and Watson, he still believes in a complete deter­
minism of human behavior. 
Behaviorism and Reductionism 
Skinner operates on the assumption that behaviors, not internal 
states, are the only acceptable data for a scientific psychology. To 
be truly empirical, psychology must exclude any dependent vari­
able that cannot be directly observed. Since stimuli in the environ­
ment can be manipulated and operationally defined, whereas con­
cepts like self, or ego, or the unconscious cannot, only behaviors 
and observable stimuli should constitute the subject matter of psy­
chology. When psychologists attempt to study internal states instead 
of behavior, Skinner (1953) believes they are looking in the wrong 
place for the causes of human behavior. 
The practice of looking inside the organism for an explanation of 
behavior has tended to obscure the variables which are im­
mediately available for scientific analysis. These variables lie 
outside the organism, in its immediate environment and in its 
environmental history, (p. 31) 
In order to scientifically study human behavior Skinner be­
lieves that the research must take place in the controlled environ­
ment of the laboratory. In addition, in order to meaningfully ma­
nipulate variables, the scientist must concentrate on simple rather 
than complex aspects of behavior. One can build toward explaining 
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the complex through a study of the simple. It is also assumed by 
Skinner that the laws of behavior apply to both humans and animals 
in the same way. Therefore, he has made extensive use of rats and 
pigeons in the lab although he agrees that we need to confirm at 
least some of these findings on human subjects. Because of this 
methodology and his basic assumptions Skinner has been criticized 
as being reductionistic (MacKay, 1974). Skinner (1974) reacts 
against this claim, however, by denying that separate levels of de­
scription of human nature exist. 
But behaviorism does not move from one dimensional system to 
another. It simply provides an alternative account of the same 
facts. It does not reduce feelings to bodily states; it simply argues 
that bodily states are and always have been what are felt. It does 
not reduce thought processes to behavior; it simply analyzes the 
behavior previously explained by the invention of thought proc­
esses. It does not reduce morality to certain features of the social 
environment; it simply insists that those features have always 
been responsible for moral behavior, (p. 265) 
This last quotation clearly identifies Skinner's brand of behaviorism. 
Skinner's behaviorism is not methodological behaviorism, which 
says that behaviorism is only a model that directs research in human 
and animal learning. Methodological behaviorism admits to the 
existence of important internal events in human beings, but says 
that they cannot be studied scientifically, and therefore that they are 
outside the domain of psychology. Skinner's radical behaviorism, 
on the other hand, denies the ultimate importance of the human 
mind by saying that it is merely the production of environmental 
events. 
Skinner's Psychology 
Skinner's assumptions make his psychological views very 
clear. His personality theory cannot have any structural concepts 
like Freud's "ego," or Rogers's "ideal self," or Eysenck's "traits." 
Such structures relate to relatively enduring qualities of organiza­
tion, whereas the behavioral approach emphasizes the importance 
of stimuli in the environment. 
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Growth and development (in the behavioral framework) are 
directly related to stimuli and behavior. For example, children be­
come more self-reliant through the reinforcement (food or praise) of 
behavior in which they take care of themselves. A child becomes 
emotionally mature through the occasional reinforcement of a sta­
ble response during which a child learns to tolerate delays in 
gratification. 
In dealing with psychopathology Skinner considers symptoms 
with underlying causes as superfluous, since behavioral pathology 
is not a disease. There is no unconscious or "sick" personality. 
Pathological behavior is a response pattern learned in the same way 
as "normal" response patterns. If you can change the maladaptive 
response, you have removed the pathology. Psychological prob­
lems are merely failures in learning a proper response, or learning 
normal responses under the control of inappropriate reinforcers. 
Depression is seen as a lowered response rate. Schizophrenics 
might be individuals who attend to unusual cues in the environment 
because they are out of touch with conditions of reinforcement. 
Lack of emotion might be a lack of responsiveness to normal social 
stimuli. The job of the therapist is to deal with target behaviors, not 
neuroses. 
In summary, this chapter has analyzed the guiding assumptions 
behind the work of B. F. Skinner. The examination of these assump­
tions provides a helpful background and foundation for under­




This chapter will briefly re- view Skinner's theory of oper­
ant conditioning and its ac- companying technology so 
that we can begin our evalua- tion of his behaviorism with a 
clear understanding of his scientific methodology and the data it 
produces. 
OPERANT CONDITIONING We will begin by distinguishing 
operant conditioning from classi­
cal conditioning and also from contiguity theories of learning. These 
differences will necessitate a slight change in the typical be-
havioristic S-R designation when describing Skinner's behaviorism. 
In classical conditioning, responses are elicited by known stimuli; 
the response is known as a respondent. The knee jerk in response to 
a tap on the patellar tendon and the pupillary constriction in re­
sponse to light are examples. Responses that are spontaneously 
emitted by an organism without any correlation with known stimuli 
are called operants. Operants usually acquire a relationship with 
preceding stimuli. They are not elicited by the stimuli, but are 
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emitted by the organism. Most human behavior is operant in nature. 
When the operant behavior emitted by the organism is made to 
occur regularly by the use of reinforcement, the process is called 
operant conditioning.1 
There is also a difference between "merely associationistic" 
theories, which are known as contiguity theories, and Skinner's 
"more than associationistic" theory, which emphasizes reinforce­
ment. E. R. Guthrie proposed a contiguity theory in which stimuli 
come to have their eliciting powers by association with responses 
and by association with each other. Skinner's reinforcement theory, 
on the other hand, incorporates the operation of reinforcement as a 
means of accounting for the formation of associations. The con­
tiguity theory does not require such reinforcement. 
With these differences briefly outlined between classical and 
operant conditioning and between contiguity and reinforcement 
theories, it can be seen that Skinner's operant conditioning theory is 
not just an ordinary S-R theory. The simple S-R designation often 
means that reinforcement is not a factor in the association of stimuli 
with responses, and the stimulus is eliciting the response. But in 
Skinner's theory an emitted response may occur in a particular 
stimulus context, but the stimuli are not the cause of the response. 
The reinforcement is seen as the controlling factor in the response of 
the organism. Therefore, instead of S-R, Skinner would prefer his 
theory to be simplified by Sd-R-Srein, where Sd represents the dis­
criminating stimulus, R the emitted behavior, and Srein the reinforc­
ing stimulus. 
Operant Conditioning and Reinforcement 
Operant conditioning simply defined means that if an operant 
behavior is followed by the presentation of a reinforcing stimulus, 
the strength of the behavior is increased. The classic example of 
operant conditioning is that of a rat in an operant test chamber, 
more commonly known as a "Skinner Box" (a name that Skinner 
The difference between operant and classical conditioning is not considered as 
sharp now as it once was (Hilgard and Bower, 1975, pp. 209-1 2), but the distinction 
does serve to help clarify Skinner's theory. 
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did not invent and detests). If a hungry rat is reinforced with food 
pellets when it presses a bar in its cage, bar pressing behavior will 
increase. 
FIGURE 4 
An operant test chamber (Skinner Box). Photo courtesy of B. F. Skinner. 
A reinforcer therefore, is a stimulus that follows a response and 
increases the probability of its recurring. The reinforcer strengthens 
the behavior it follows. Skinner has refused to biologize the concept 
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of reinforcement; he has refused to "explain" what makes rein-
forcers reinforcing. He does not invoke homeostatic concepts like 
drives, wants, hungers, and the like. What he does insist on is a 
psychology that describes the functional relationships between be­
haviors and environmental stimuli. 
In operant conditioning reinforcement does not appear until 
after the appropriate response is emitted. Therefore, it is said that 
reinforcement is contingent upon that response. The contingencies 
of reinforcement so often spoken of by Skinner are the rules gov­
erning the relationship between responses and reinforcement. 
Superstitious behavior is an example of conditioning in which there 
are no systematic contingencies. 
Reinforcements may be of several types: primary or secondary, 
positive or negative, continuous or partial. Primary, or uncon­
ditioned reinforcement, is the reward to which an organism "natur­
ally" responds. Food, water, sex, comfort, and freedom from pain 
are the usual primary reinforcers. Secondary or conditioned rein­
forcement is a formerly neutral stimulus that has become reinforcing 
because of its repeated association with a stimulus that is reinforc­
ing. Secondary reinforcers will lose their reinforcing effects when 
repeatedly applied to a response for which there is no eventual 
primary reinforcement. Skinner would see stimuli such as money 
and praise as extremely effective secondary reinforcers. 
Positive reinforcement is any reinforcement that increases the 
probability of the recurrence of the preceding response. Notice that 
the term reinforcement is being defined in terms of its behavioral 
effects. Any attempt to specify what is reinforcing on other grounds 
such as need reduction is not of interest to Skinner. In particular the 
physiological mechanisms involved are not a necessary part of the 
science of behavior. Negative reinforcement is an unpleasant or 
aversive stimulus, which, when removed, increases the probability 
of the recurrence of the preceding response. This brings to mind the 
joke about one man asking another why he was beating himself 
over the head with a brick. The man's answer was, "Because it feels 
so good when I quit." This illustration serves to distinguish negative 
reinforcement from punishment. Negative reinforcement is rein-
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forcing and serves to increase the probability of the recurrence of 
preceding behavior. Punishment, on the other hand, decreases the 
probability of a response. However, Skinner feels that the effect of 
punishment is temporary and appears to be of little value in 
eliminating behavior. For this reason he has emphasized only posi­
tive and negative reinforcement. 
Continuous reinforcement is reinforcement that is associated 
with every response of the organism. Partial reinforcement is some­
times called intermittent reinforcement because not every response 
is followed by a reinforcer. Skinner discovered the effectiveness of 
this type of reinforcement quite by accident. Being low on food 
pellets one day, he set up his animal apparatus for partial rein­
forcement, and even more responding was observed. One final term 
related to the concept of reinforcement is extinction. When a be­
havior is no longer followed by a reinforcement, that behavior will 
weaken and eventually stop. The rate of this extinction is a function 
of the past history of reinforcement for that behavior. 
THE CONDITIONING It is easy to see how operant condi-
OF COMPLEX BEHAVIOR tioning works in simple behavior like 
bar pressing. The animal makes a re­
sponse, is reinforced and subsequently learns to make that response 
with increasing frequency. Understanding how operant condition­
ing works with complex behaviors is more difficult since there are 
many behaviors that one would never expect to be emitted spon­
taneously and therefore could never be reinforced. You might, for 
example, expect your dog to chase cars, but it is doubtful that he 
would ever spontaneously get your slippers and lay them beside 
your easy chair. How, therefore, can reinforcement be applied to 
this complex behavior? The answer is found in the concepts of 
shaping and chaining. 
Shaping is the conditioning of a complex behavior by rein­
forcing gradual approximations of that desired response. In our 
example of the dog and your slippers, for example, you might begin 
to produce slipper-getting behavior by at first reinforcing any 
movement of the dog in the direction of the slippers. Then, withhold 
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reinforcement until the dog emits a few steps toward the slippers. 
Then, again withhold reinforcement until it is sniffing and pushing 
at the slippers. In this way you are gradually shaping the dog's 
behavior toward the desired response. 
Another way complex behavior can be produced by operant 
conditioning is by the method of response chaining. In chaining, a 
sequence of individual behavioral responses is assembled into a 
performance unit. The successive stimuli in the chain act as de-
scriminative stimuli for responding in their presence and as secon­
dary reinforcers for the responses that precede them. An example of 
a chained response is the complex sequence of behaviors that cir­
cus animals perform. Each of the individual behaviors that consti­
tute the eventual "act" are reinforced and then are linked with 
others to compose the total response. 
APPLICATIONS The applications of the principles 
OF SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM of operant conditioning have 
been numerous and varied. Op­
erant conditioning has been used to speed up animal learning, 
improve patient behavior in psychiatric wards, improve school 
learning, cure problems like stuttering and bed wetting, remove 
disruptive or delinquent behavior, teach the self-control of un­
wanted habits, and do other useful things. 
One of Skinner's most novel applications was the teaching 
machine and programmed learning in the field of education. While 
teaching machines have not replaced teachers, they and pro­
grammed learning texts are widely used today. Although Skinner 
did not invent the teaching machine, which was patented over 
one-hundred years ago, he did give us its modern form. The teach­
ing machine emphasizes immediate reinforcement when a correct 
response is emitted by a student; it helps shape complex responses. 
The modern teaching machine consists of a window to display 
questions or statements in which a word has been left out. After a 
question is asked, the student must write in an answer, and then pull 
a ever to reveal the correct answer. Reinforcement is obtained 
because the machine then moves ahead to the next question. If the 
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student is correct, he or she moves to the next item. 
In therapy, behavior modification techniques based upon op­
erant conditioning have been used extensively to cure obesity, 
asthma, stuttering, phobias, anti-social acts, marital difficulties, 
depression, alcoholism, drug addiction, fetishism, auditory halluci­
nations, schizophrenic behavior, childhood autism, mental retar­
dation, and other pathological behaviors. The list seems almost 
endless. In general, behavior modification proceeds by arranging 
contingencies in the environment so that undesirable behavior is 
not reinforced but desirable behavior is. This may sound simple, but 
the identification and manipulation of relevant reinforcing agents in 
the existing environment can be exceedingly difficult. 
Language skills have also been effectively taught to autistic 
children using behavior modification techniques. Prompts, food, 
and praise reinforcements have been used very effectively to shape 
these children's attending behavior and simple vocalizations into 
into meaningful language. 
Behavior modification principles have been applied to large 
groups of individuals by the use of token economies, techniques in 
which tokens, such as plastic chips or credit cards that can be 
punched, act as secondary reinforcers that can be converted into 
primary reinforcers. The system, which can generally only be 
applied in highly controlled environmental settings like hospitals, 
prisons, or classrooms, usually operates on a contract basis and the 
person is informed of what behavior is expected for the tokens. 
Some economies even require tokens for meals! Other large scale 
applications of behavior modification techniques are occurring 
today in the form of reinforcements given for car pooling or the 
control of littering. 
At this time the application of operant conditioning principles 
to the whole of society is speculative and Utopian, and because of 
the difficulties involved in such applications, they might forever 
remain mere speculations. Skinner, however, is hopeful and has 
outlined the potential for the behavioral management of an entire 
society in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971), and Walden Two 
(1948). Walden Two makes very interesting reading for students of 
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human behavior but it is not terribly exciting as a novel, since like 
most Utopian books, it has no plot; it is basically a guided tour and 
lecture. In the book Skinner's alter-ego and designer of Walden 
Two, Frazier, discusses the details of the behaviorally managed 
community and the dreams of applying such principles to entire 
nations and even the world. 
Some of Skinner's optimism concerning the use of the princi­
ples of behaviorism for the management of society can be seen in 
the fact that Walden Two was written shortly after the "pigeons in a 
pelican" project was terminated. Skinner (1961) comments on this: 
In the year which followed the termination of Project Pigeon I 
wrote Walden Two, a Utopian picture of a properly engineered 
society. Some psychotherapists might argue that I was suffering 
from personal rejection and simply retreated to a fantasied world 
where everything went according to plan, and where there never 
was heard a discouraging word. But another explanation is, I 
think, equally plausible. That piece of science fiction was a dec­
laration of confidence in a technology of behavior. Call it a 
crackpot idea if you will; it is one in which I have never lost faith. 
I still believe that the same kind of wide-ranging speculation 
about human affairs, supported by studies of compensatory rigor, 
will make a substantial contribution toward that world of the 
future in which, among other things, there will be no need for 
guided missiles, (p. 426.18) 
Having briefly presented the major features of Skinner's be­
haviorism and its application, we will now begin both a more 
thorough presentation and critical analysis of these ideas. Chapter 4 
will begin our evaluation by looking at some of the general sci­
entific problems Skinner's behaviorism presents. 
THE SCIENTIFIC LIMITS 
One of the greatest difficulties 
retical perspectives is that of 
the evaluation will be. Most of 
in evaluating Skinner's theo-
deciding what the grounds of 
Skinner's critics do not quar­
rel with his scientific methods or his data, but rather with the 
philosophical weaknesses and the broader attempts at applying his 
behavioristic theory to complex human functioning. Specifically, 
Skinner's critics have suggested that behavioristic methods can 
never give an adequate view of human nature and that it is impossi­
ble to generalize and apply to human principles of behavior ob­
served in simple animals. Skinner responds to such philosophical 
criticisms by saying that his science is being misunderstood. There­
fore Skinner sets up a dichotomy between science and philosophy. 
Unfortunately, when this happens it seems that we are forced 
to choose between the clear, objective data of the scientific labora­
tory, and obtuse, ancient, armchair speculation. Given this as a 
choice, of course, many people feel impelled to go along with what 
science has purportedly proven about human nature rather than 
accept religious or philosophical viewpoints. The position taken by 
this author is that the dichotomy is artificial, and that it is not only 
41 
42 • B. F. SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM 
feasible but actually essential that our scientific work be carried out 
within the framework of one or more broad philosophical or reli­
gious views of reality and human nature. 
The best scientist is the one who knows what the scientific tools 
can or cannot do. Therefore, it is scientific criticism to look care­
fully at the limits of Skinner's scientific methods as well as at its 
contributions. It is essential to ask philosophical questions because 
all science is carried out in the midst of philosophical assumptions 
and speculations. The data one selects for study, the subjects one 
uses, the problems studied, and the methods used to study problems 
all reflect basic assumptions and religious and philosophical per­
spectives. If one is a poor philosopher, or if the philosophical un­
derpinning of one's scientific endeavors are not made explicit, then 
that person's science is bound by the same poverty. 
This chapter will focus on three perceived limits to Skinner's 
behaviorism as a science: (1) the limits of empirical, behavioristic 
methods in studying human nature, (2) the limits of generalizations 
from simple behaviors and animal subjects, and (3) the limits of a 
behaviorism that has historically isolated itself from most other 
forms of psychology. 
THE LIMITS OF In analyzing a scientific system 
BEHAVIORISTIC KNOWLEDGE of thought it is of value to ask 
questions regarding the par­
ticulars of the method of knowing in that system. The method of 
knowing chosen by the behaviorist is empiricism, knowledge solely 
from sensory experience. This choice obviously has much to com­
mend it since behavior can be observed, whereas thought or emo­
tions cannot be so directly studied. The question asked here, how-
ever, is, What kind of restrictions has behaviorism placed on itself 
by limiting the study of human nature to the study of human be­
havior? 
The Positivist Approach 
Skinner (1938) has defined the epistemological roots of his own 
system as positivistic. 
THE SCIENTIFIC LIMITS • 43 
So far as scientific method is concerned, the system set up in the 
preceding chapter is as follows. It is positivistic. It confines itself 
to description rather than explanation, (p. 44) 
Positivism is a philosophical position intended to set limits to 
philosophical inquiry and thus avoid meaningless discussion. 
Positivism says that only statements that have meaning, that is, those 
that can be empirically verified through sense experience, are worth 
discussing. The statement, "There is oxygen in this jar," is mean­
ingful because it can be verified empirically. However, the state­
ment, "Adultery is immoral," is meaningless because it cannot be 
empirically verified. In fact, according to positivism, statements 
about God, mind, evil, freedom, wrong, and other similar subjects 
are in this meaningless category, and consequently, it would be a 
waste of time and effort to discuss them. 
One major problem with positivism is that it destroys itself by 
its own definition of what constitutes a meaningless statement. The 
basic proposition of positivism is, Only factual statements that can 
be verified by sense experience are meaningful; any other kind of 
statement is meaningless jibberish. According to this proposition, 
positivism is meaningless jibberish since its basic proposition can­
not be verified by a sense experience! This is similar to a teacher 
trying to communicate that all communication is impossible; in the 
very act of communicating the theory, the teacher would negate it. 
Positivism also negates itself in that, if it is true that empirically 
unverifiable statements are meaningless, then the statements of 
positivism itself must also be meaningless, since they cannot be 
empirically verified. 
A second criticism of positivism that relates to a problem with 
Skinner's positivistic behaviorism is that positivism represents a 
self-imposed intellectual ignorance. So much of reality is beyond 
discussion or study, that we are in danger of limiting our study to the 
trivial. The great themes of life, religion, value, purpose, and evil are 
relegated from discussion. In behaviorism the activities of persons 
may be studied, but the essence of humanity is lost from view by 
this positivistic influence. 
Empiricism and behaviorism are obviously related to positivis-
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tic thinking in that they, too, are self-imposed intellectual restric­
tions. The empiricist says we can only learn truth by sense experi­
ence. Some more radical formulations of empiricism state that the 
only reality that exists is that which is empirically verifiable. In­
terestingly, there is no way to empirically verify this statement! It has 
to be accepted on faith. We should be very skeptical of any system 
that contradicts itself in its own explanation of reality. 
Beginning the study of psychology with such a hard-headed 
empirical approach is often considered essential and very scientific. 
Actually, the statements made by radical empiricism might be con­
sidered unscientific when the inherent dogma is considered and 
contrasted with the humility that should characterize the scientific 
search. Ftiilosopher Elton Trueblood reflected on this idea (True-
blood, 1973): 
. . . science at its best is very humble in the face of nature and the 
ultimate mysteries. Science asks questions and accepts evidence 
of all kinds without judging the situation in advance. To say that 
we cannot know objective reality except by means of sense 
experience is clearly to prejudge the case. It is, therefore, unsci-
" entific. (p. 197) 
The Behavioristic Approach 
Skinner's behaviorism also suffers the danger of being consid­
ered unscientific because, in the effort to make sure that he knows 
something about human nature that is without error, Skinner may 
have left himself with very little knowledge of human nature at all. 
Limiting the study of human nature to the study of human behavior 
precludes ever getting a complete picture. In fact, it has left the 
psychology books with discussions that relate very little to human 
nature. Topics such as human motivation, thinking, creativity, sub­
conscious, emotion, aspiration, prejudice, and others are essentially 
lost to the behaviorist; to say that they do not exist is to prejudge the 
case. Redefining these elements of human nature in terms of human 
behavior may aid in understanding them, but descriptions of the 
relationship of certain behaviors to environmental contingencies 
falls short of explaining their nature and origin. Skinner's discus-
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sions about the contents and operations of the mind, the nature of 
freedom, and personality are limited by the behaviors and reinforc­
ing stimuli he can observe. It is no wonder that he fails to find 
"person" and "freedom"; his method cannot measure such things. 
When he says that these do not exist, he is failing to recognize the 
limits of his method of knowing. 
Operationalism 
Psychology's method for achieving empirical descriptions of 
psychological subject matter is through the use of operational 
definitions. An operantional definition is a definition in terms of 
some easily identifiable behavioral operation; it is usually quantifi­
able. Psychological research could not be conducted without the 
use of operational definitions, but the same research is limited to the 
validity of its operational terms. For example, instead of dealing 
with the nebulous concept of love in an experiment, a researcher 
might define ten dates with the same person or sexual intimacy as 
love. An angry person could be operationally identified by that 
person's harsh words. One of the difficulties with operational terms 
is the frequent need to operationally define the operational defini­
tions. What exactly is meant by a date? Does an unplanned meeting 
in the park qualify? What is meant by harsh words? Is a swear word 
indicative of anger or disappointment? And might not the same 
word have different meanings and communicate different emo­
tional states for different people at different times? The fact that there 
are numerous definitions of anxiety is a case in point. One re­
searcher may operationally define anxiety through the use of MMPI 
scales, while another may define it in terms of the measurement of 
the Galvanic Skin Response. And these two different measures of 
anxiety may correlate little with each other! 
A more pertinent question about operational terms concerns 
the behavioral definition's ability to specify the nature of a psycho­
logical phenomenon. When psychological phenomena are defined 
in terms of observable behaviors, something of the essence of what 
is being defined is lost. When a behaviorist summarizes his research 
in a textbook by saying that love is a product of the environment, he 
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is really saying that his operational definition of love is a product of 
the environment. The value of psychological research depends 
upon how close a relationship actually exists between the mental 
event and the behavioral definition of the mental event. 
Since human mental states are so difficult to define operation­
ally, many behaviorists simply refuse to study psychological vari­
ables, saying that they cannot be empirically investigated. A be-
haviorist, therefore, ought to be agnostic about his ability to study 
the existence, meaning, and importance of internal mind states. If 
the internal state that is of interest is undefinable, then it cannot be 
studied or related to the environment. 
Skinner, however, is not at all agnostic about human mental 
states! He assumes that his behavioral definitions of mental states 
are equal to the supposed psychological states. In this way he can 
claim to be an authority on such states and still remain an empiri­
cist. But, with this approach Skinner is assuming the very thing that 
he says his science is proving, that is, he assumes that mental states 
are unimportant correlates of behaviors, and then after much re­
search on mental states (subject behaviors), he declares that mental 
states are merely behaviors. 
This discussion of operational definitions and behaviorism was 
not meant to criticize their use in psychology, for they are essential. 
But we must recognize their limits and realize that our experi­
mentation and theorizing is only as accurate as our operational 
definitions; the definitions must define reality. Skinner's definitions 
of mental phenomena are potentially far removed from human 
emotions and thinking, and therefore, his research results lose some 
of their explanatory power. 
Noam Chomsky, an open critic of Skinner's behaviorism, has 
pointed out an example of behaviorism's problem with operational 
e initions. The concept of reinforcement is defined by the be-
aviorist as any stimulus that can act to increase the probability of a 
recurrence of a response of an organism. This is a circular definition 
at serves to protect the operant conditioning model from ever 
being shown to be incorrect. If a behaviorist is asked why an animal 
or human failed to respond in the presence of a reinforcing stimulus 
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(i.e., Might your theory be wrong?), the answer given is that it is 
obvious that the stimulus was not a reinforcer for this orgnaism 
because the organism failed to respond. But, this is again a case of 
assuming in one's operational definition what one wants to show, 
and it completely removes the possibility that the theory can be 
proven wrong. If a food reward fails to increase a rat s behavior, 
rather than doubting the truth of operant conditioning theory the 
behaviorist merely has to say that it is obvious (since operant condi­
tioning theory is true) that the food couldn't have been a reinforcer 
in this case, or otherwise the rat would have performed. But what 
we are trying to determine is whether or not reinforcement does 
control behavior, therefore, the behaviorist shouldnt assume that 
reinforcement does control behavior in his very definition of rein­
forcement. This is clearly a case of assuming in one's argument the 
very point to be proven. In other words, the behaviorist assumes in 
his operational definition of reinforcement the truth of operant con­
ditioning theory. This is not good science. If a theory is not falsifi-
able, it is no longer an acceptable scientific theory. Chomsky (1959) 
summarizes this point with respect to verbal behavior. 
It seems that Skinner's claim that all verbal behavior is acquired 
and maintained in "strength" through reinforcement is quite 
empty, because his notion of reinforcement has no clear content, 
functioning only as a cover term for any factor, detectable or not, 
related to the acquisition or maintenance of behavior, (p. 226) 
THE LIMITS OF GENERALIZING There is most certainly a place 
FROM THE SIMPLE in psychology for the investi-
AND THE ANIMAL gation of simple behaviors 
before proceding to complex 
ones. A valid case can also be made for using animals as subjects 
and generalizing some of the findings to humans. Studying simp e 
behaviors and using animal subjects in experimentation a"°w or a 
greater degree of control than is possible with complex varia es or 
human subjects. There is a serious question, however, about t e 
heavy reliance Skinner has placed upon the investigation of simp e 
animal behaviors as a basis for his philosophical pronouncements 
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about the nature of human freedom, motivation, learning, psycho-
pathology, and so forth. Skinner's willingness to generalize far be­
yond the data was seen in his first book. Despite the fact that it was 
almost exclusively about rats in bar pressing situations, it was called 
The Behavior of Organisms. While there has been some operant 
conditioning research done on higher animals and humans, it is 
quite clear that it has not been Skinner's priority to extend his re­
search efforts into complex variables and on human subjects before 
announcing discoveries about human nature. 
Skinner, however, assumes that any complex behavior, even a 
human behavior, is composed of an assemblage of simpler be­
haviors that can be shown to be learned by operant conditioning. 
He also assumes that the principles of learning found in the animal, 
particularly the rat and the pigeon, are identical to the principles of 
learning behind all human behavior. He says in his own defense 
(Skinner, 1974), "Enough has been done to suggest that the same 
basic processes occur in both animals and men" (p. 250). 
The problem with these two assumptions is that Skinner is 
again assuming the very points that are in question. Skinner as­
sumes that complex human behaviors are just an assemblage of 
simple behaviors. For this reason he confines his studies to simple 
animal behaviors, and then feels perfectly safe to generalize his 
animal results to explain complex human behaviors. What is 
needed is research to shed light on this question and not pro­
nouncements to the effect that science has demonstrated the be-
haviorist's model of human nature! First, there should be extensive 
research on the operant conditioning of primates to determine if the 
basic principles formulated on rats and pigeons remain valid. Sec­
ond, though it is difficult, more behavioristic research needs to be 
done on humans to isolate the supposed controlling primary and 
secondary reinforcers responsible for complex human functions, 
such as creative, verbal, and moral behaviors. 
It is essential to realize that Skinner has not made a scientific 
discovery to the effect that all human behavior is the product of 
environmental conditioning. He has hardly studied humans or the 
behaviors most in question. He has run very selective experiments 
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showing conditioning, has made no attempt to design an experi­
ment to disprove his basic thesis on human nature, and it is doubtful 
that any human data produced could not be reduced to his ambigu­
ous behavioristic language explaining it away. Consequently there 
are serious doubts about his "scientific" discovery that all the ac­
complishments of human life from simple, physical reflexes to the 
construction of a poem could be successfully reduced to bits of 
operantly conditioned behavior. Skinner is safest in his assumptions 
about human behavior when he talks about behaviors also seen in 
the rat, and least safe in the areas of private human mental life that 
we cannot directly investigate. 
Skinner's generalizations from research are also limited by the 
experimental situations and equipment he has chosen to concen­
trate on. The tightly controlled environment of the Skinner Box 
greatly limits the range of behaviors a rat can demonstrate. There 
are very few responses that the Skinner Box is equipped to record. 
The responses one chooses to observe in an animal dictate a great 
deal of the kind of theory one can hold in psychology. Tolman and 
Kohler's research on animal learning broadened the environmental 
context in which animals could operate; they learned that certain 
animal behavior was not at all related to the contingencies of rein­
forcement in the history of the animal but rather to variables like 
insight and cognitive maps. 
Learning psychologist James McConnell (1977) has written a 
short science fiction story about a learning theorist who was cap­
tured and transferred to a spaceship. His captors were alien psy­
chologists who planned to observe him as an "animal" specimen. 
They placed him in a research box to see if all of their favorite 
learning theories would describe his behavior. As this human 
learning theorist was traveling through space going who knows 
where, his captors were conducting operant conditioning experi­
ments on him. He was terribly frustrated by this situation because 
the restrictiveness of the experimental apparatus and the food de­
privation virtually guaranteed that he would perform according to 
conditioning theory. He had no way to demonstrate his advanced 
cognitive abilities. He also realized that if he did make his abilities 
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known, he would no longer be performing according to theory and 
might be sacrificed as a "sick" specimen. 
McConnell's story is only fiction, but, according to E. C. Tol-
man, rats in different circumstances can show cognitive approaches 
to learning. In a very real sense the whole of human nature is limited 
by what Skinner's subjects can do in his box of empirical restric­
tions. 
THE LIMITS OF AN Another major problem for behav-
ISOLATED BEHAVIORISM iorism is Skinner's unwillingness to 
work through some of the solid data 
and theories of other psychologies that run counter to his own. The 
reason is not that Skinner is unaware of the other theories and data, 
but that behaviorism is limited, in the interests of being "scientific," 
to a particular view of human nature and knowledge; no serious 
consideration is given to other scientific areas of psychology. 
Psychology in the form of behaviorism won the hard-fought 
battle to become an empirical science by initially rejecting the in­
trospection of Wundt and the rationalistic concepts of Wertheimer's 
Cestalt psychology. So, too, today when any competing psycho­
logical system utilizes methods that are less empirical than be­
haviorism, or invokes explanations with a rationalistic or mentalis-
tic leaning, they are simply ignored. The scientific "objectivity" of-
behaviorism has been won at the expensive price of isolation from 
most nonbehavioristic systems including physiological psychology. 
Daniel Robinson (1979) in his excellent treatment of systems of 
modern psychology, described this problem of Skinner's be­
haviorism this way: 
The problem is that as a purely descriptive enterprise with official 
sanctions against biological and cognitive theorizing, it is not 
equipped even in principle to embrace such subjects and pro­
cesses. (p. 140) 
The problem for Skinner is that a massive amount of scientific 
research in other areas of psychology supports a more rationalistic 
picture of man. Well-established areas like Piaget's stage theory, 
Cestalt psychology, Tolman's purposive behaviorism and modern 
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cognitive psychology, Karl Lashley's principle of mass action in 
physiological psychology, studies in ethology, and Chomsky's lan­
guage development theory all speak out against the associationistic, 
empirical model of man in Skinner's radical behaviorism. Skinner's 
behaviorism faces the pressure to change, since it is difficult to 
reduce all of these kinds of data to a behavioristic system. Skinner 
does not come to terms with these psychologies simply because his 
system must reject the kinds of theoretical constructs they use. In the 
next chapter I will consider the data and theories of some of these 
psychologies that run counter to Skinner's behaviorism. 
Skinner's behaviorism also fails to explain some additional 
findings of operant conditioning experiments. For example, two 
former associates of Skinner, Keller and Marion Breland, used their 
training in operant conditioning to establish an animal training 
business. In 1960 they published a whimsical paper in the Ameri­
can Psychologist entitled, "The Misbehavior of Organisms," which 
detailed the contingencies of reinforcement that did not succeed 
entirely in controlling what the animals did. Animals often did 
things they were not reinforced for. These "misbehaviors" seemed 
to be species-specific, food-related behaviors. It appears that mem­
bers of a species are instinctively "prepared" to make certain 
learned attachments. In another article entitled "Learning 
Theory—Two Trials and Tribulations," Freedman, Cohen, and 
Hennessy (1974) reversed the hypothesis of Skinner and showed 
that a behavior followed by a reinforcement is likely not to be 
repeated. This kind of data needs to be seriously considered in 
evaluating the adequacy of Skinner's model of learning. 
Another problem with Skinner's model of operant conditioning 
is his emphasis on proximate external consequences as controllers 
of behavior. Countless human studies have demonstrated that con­
sequences do not have to be immediate for humans to learn. Be­
cause a human being represents things symbolically he is able to 
bring his behavior under the control of distant consequences 
through anticipatory thought. The principles of observational 
learning have been well established (Bandura, 1971) and illustrate 
that humans and animals can learn with delayed reinforcement 
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because they are able to "hold" learning as a central event rather 
than as a peripheral event tied up in some musculature response. 
None of these kinds of findings are anticipated by the principles of 
operant conditioning. 
SUMMARY In conclusion, it seems that while certain aspects of 
Skinner's behaviorism pose significant problems, his 
system is so exclusive that it attempts to exclude all possible criti­
cism. Skinner's scientific work has clearly amassed a great deal of 
data and contributed immensely to our understanding of behavior, 
especially animal behavior. He clearly deserves the recognition he 
has received as one of the foremost psychological scientists of this 
century. 
When Skinner theorizes about the meaning of his data, how­
ever, he repeatedly makes grand inferences about human behavior 
from studies of animals. His methods, by their very nature, exclude 
observations about unique, human experiences (if such, in fact, 
exist!). His "science" has also been conducted within a circular, 
theoretical logic that rules out the possibility of change in the light 
of other theories and data. Consequently Skinner's science has a 
tendency to become scientism; he has traded the humility of 
knowledge for the rigidity of dogma. 
THE QUESTION OF MIND 
In addition to the problems that arise because of Skinner's 
generalization and applica- E[ t'on animal responses to 
human behavior and the limi- tations of his methodology 
for studying complex human functions, another problem has 
plagued S-R psychologies since the days of Watson. That problem is 
the mounting evidence for the existence of important, inner, 
controlling, mental or cognitive states in human beings. These states 
alter stimuli and help generate responses. In other words, quite 
apart from religious and philosophical views on the nature of man, 
there is psychological evidence that indicates that the control of the 
person comes not only from the outside environment but also from 
the inner person. 
Problems for Watson's S-R psychology developed early when 
Wertheimer published his findings on the phi phenomenon, and 
when Gestalt psychology began its study of perceptual illusions. 
The phi phenomenon is a simple illusion, in which two lights 
blinking alternately appear as one light moving from side to side. 
The problem with this observation for any S-R psychology is that the 
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experience or response is obviously not just a function of the 
stimulus input. In the physical world there are two blinking lights; in 
the world of experience there is only one moving light. It is clear 
that something must be intervening between stimulus and response 
that actively changes the stimulus into the response observed. After 
such demonstrations Gestalt psychologists felt that the important 
variables in human behavior were internal and not external. Other 
Gestalt examples are forms such as a square; Why are its four lines 
seen as a square—something greater than the sum of the parts? Or, 
consider the Muller-Lyer illusion. This well-known illusion involves 
two horizontal lines of identical length; one has arrowheads that 
point inward and the other has arrowheads that point outward. The 
illusion is that the line with the inward pointing arrowheads is 
decidedly longer. Again, the stimulus cannot be related to the re­
sponse without positing an important, active, internal state that ma­
nipulates stimulus input. 
The Muller-Lyer illusion. The line with the outgoing arrowheads 
appears to be longer than the line with the ingoing arrowheads. 
The problems for S-R psychologists do not end with a few 
illusions from Gestalt psychologists. The research of sensory psy­
chology in areas as diverse as human pattern perception and social 
perception has yielded the unshakeable thesis that one's perceptual 
experience is only in a small way the product of the stimulus world. 
The most important variables in perception have been shown to be 
FIGURE 5 
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memory, expectation, motivation, and attention. American be­
haviorism has been further beleaguered by onslaughts from a di­
verse number of research areas such as Wolfgang Kohler's insight 
learning in apes, Jean Piaget's rationalistic stage theory, and Noam 
Chomsky's nativistic evidences in language acquisition. Karl 
Lashley's principle of mass action was a watershed principle, shift­
ing physiological psychology away from associationistic, synaptic 
theories of learning and memory. American behavioristic learning 
theory itself was in a rapid movement toward the intervening vari­
ables (i.e., variables between S and R) of Clark Hull's learning 
theory, and the "purposive" behaviorism of E. C. Tolman, whose 
discussion of cognitive maps and latent learning made psychol­
ogists reconsider the "mind" of the rat. 
This, then, was the psychological climate in which Skinner 
developed a behaviorism rooted in the Watsonian empirical view of 
human nature. Consequently, it has been of utmost importance for 
Skinner to de-emphasize his theory's relationship with traditional 
stimulus-response psychology. Since he emphasizes the concept of 
reinforcement, Skinner considers his behaviorism to be not an S-R 
psychology but an S-R-S psychology. More specifically it is an Sd-
R-Srem psychology, in which Sd is the discriminative stimulus and S'r" 
is the reinforcing stimulus. Skinner holds that his theory is not an S-R 
theory in the sense of a Watsonian theory of stimuli eliciting re­
sponses. To Skinner the organism emits a response (in the context of 
a stimulus environment), which is controlled by the following rein­
forcing stimulus. This difference between Skinner and Watson is 
clear, but the question remains how an Sd-R-Sre ,n psychology avoids 
the problem of explaining internal mental states as an important part 
of the person. The only avenue open to Skinner is to include these 
internal states as part of the R, that is, these internal thoughts, moti­
vations, and feelings, that seem so obviously to have a role in 
human behavior, are as much a product of the conditioning envi­
ronment as the visible behaviors of the person. 
We can summarize Skinner's position on this issue as follows: 
Skinner's behaviorism says that all behavior is a product of the 
environment. Other research, however, shows that internal vari-
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ables of mind play a major role in human behavior. Skinner then 
counters that these mental variables, too, are shaped and controlled 
by the environment according to principles of operant conditioning. 
Because of the demonstrated limitation of S-R psychology, 
Skinner has extended his theory to describe the conditioning of 
internal mind states. While not denying the existence of internal 
states, he has sought to reinterpret them and to set his views apart 
from traditional S-R psychology. For this reason a great deal of the 
content of Skinner's recent books has been devoted to the defense 
of his position on mental phenomenon. In fact, his Science and 
Human Behavior (1953), Verbal Behavior (1957), Beyond Freedom 
and Dignity (1971), and About Behaviorism (1974) read like an 
effort to save behaviorism from cognitive psychology. In the Preface 
(June, 1966) to the seventh printing of The Behavior of Organisms 
(1938), Skinner reviewed his approach to S-R psychology and cog­
nitive variables quite clearly. 
The Behavior of Organisms is often placed quite erroneously in 
the S-R tradition. The book remains committed to the program 
stated in my 1931 paper in which the stimulus occupied no 
special place among the independent variables. The simplest 
contingencies involve at least three terms—stimulus, response, 
and reinforcer—and at least one other variable (the deprivation 
associated with the reinforcer) is implied. This is very much more 
than input and output, and when all relevant variables are thus 
taken into account, there is no need to appeal to an inner ap­
paratus, whether mental, psychological, or conceptual. The con­
tingencies are quite enough to account for attending, remem­
bering, learning, forgetting, generalizing, abstracting, and many 
so called cognitive processes. In the same way, histories of satia­
tion and deprivation take the place of internalized drives, 
schedules of reinforcement account for sustained probabilities of 
responding otherwise attributed to dispositions of traits and so 
on. (p. xii) 
While the evidence cited against Skinner's behaviorism has not 
forced him to radically change his theory, it has, nonetheless forced 
him to clarify it and to acknowledge that mental events have to be 
explained. But the question remains, Can Skinner demonstrate that 
all mental events are indeed a product of the environment? 
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SKINNER'S VIEW OF THE MIND Skinner's radical behaviorism 
suggests that we can have di­
rect access to internal mental events because they are controlled by 
the same environmental contingencies that cause outward be­
haviors. For Skinner, observable behavior (including physiological 
responses) is the stuff of which internal states are constructed. First a 
person responds, and then the physical bodily response and its 
interpretation become the internal "mind state" of the person. By 
studying the external behaviors responsible for internal states one 
can learn about the internal states themselves. This viewpoint is 
very closely related to the James-Lange theory of emotions, which 
says that one's bodily feelings during autonomic nervous system 
arousal are the emotions one experiences and learns to call mental 
states. 
Skinner does not deny the existence of inner emotions, 
thoughts, or motivations, but he does seek to redefine them. Skinner 
says that a thought is simply a sensing of one's own behavior. 
Unfortunately, according to Skinner, we have for centuries mis­
labeled these feelings as the "mind's content," and since we insist 
on attributing behavior to this inner person, we resist any technol­
ogy of behavior control. He writes (Skinner, 1974): 
Feelings are not the causes of behavior. But what are the feelings 
made of? We usually say mind. To get a child to eat we deprive 
him of food (physical event) and then he feels hungry (mental 
event) and then he eats (physical event). The question is how did 
the food deprivation cause the feelings and how did those feel­
ings cause behavior, (p. 11) 
Thought, says Skinner (1957) 
is simply behavior, verbal or nonverbal, covert or overt. It is not 
some mysterious process responsible for behavior but the very 
behavior itself in all the complexity of its controlling relations, 
(p. 449) 
In About Behaviorism (1974) he writes, 
Mental life and the world in which it is lived are inventions. They 
have been invented on the analogy of external behavior occur­
ring under external contingencies. Thinking is behaving, (p. 115) 
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His view of the self inside the skin is: 
A self is a repertoire of behavior appropriate to a given set of 
contingencies. (1971, p. 189) 
Self is simply a device for representing a functionally unified 
set of responses. (1953, p. 285) 
All these quotations show that, while Skinner believes in the 
existence of the mind, he relegates it to the category of feelings 
during behavior. Mental states do not initiate behavior but are 
caused by it. And, in the same way that the environment controls a 
person's behavior, it also controls his thinking and feelings. This 
view of the mind suffers from the same problems as some of Skin­
ner's other conclusions; there is no evidence to support it. Al­
though it is an option, the case for Skinner's view of mental phe­
nomena is not based on human laboratory research but on his 
theoretical assumptions, and on the generalization of his operant 
conditioning principles to make them apply to complex human 
activity. 
Consider a man who plays eighteen holes of golf every week 
hoping to break a score of eighty. Shall we say he is "hoping" to do 
this or do the "contingencies of partial reinforcement" explain his 
behavior? Feelings of hope and cognition, Skinner says, should be 
explained as collaterals of behavior and not initiators of it. But the 
question needs to be answered, can Skinner actually show that 
thought is conditioned? Are the contingencies of reinforcement 
supposed by Skinner supported by persuasive evidence? Has any 
attempt been made to identify the primary and secondary rein­
forcement histories behind such a man's mental state? Anyone who 
has read Science and Human Behavior (1953), Beyond Freedom 
and Dignity (1971), and About Behaviorism (1974) can clearly see 
that Skinner does not rely on carefully developed data (from, for 
example, extinction and secondary reinforcement or shaping and 
chaining) for his explanation of mental states. Vet, if his view of 
mind is correct, we should be able to find such precise data in our 
investigation of human mental behavior. Noam Chomsky in his 
"Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior" (1959) said, 
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What has been hoped for from the psychologist is some indica­
tion how the casual and informal description of everyday be­
havior in the popular vocabulary can be explained or clarified in 
terms of the notions developed in careful experiment and obser­
vation, or perhaps replaced in terms of a better scheme. A mere 
terminological revision, in which a term is used with the full 
vagueness of the ordinary vocabulary is of no conceivable inter­
est. ... It seems that Skinner's claim that all verbal behavior is 
acquired and maintained in "strength" through reinforcement is 
quite empty, because his notion of reinforcement has no clear 
content, functioning only as a cover term for any factor, detect­
able or not, related to the acquisition or maintenance of be­
havior. (pp. 226-27) 
JAMES-LANGE REVISITED Skinner's theory of human mental 
states is very similar to the James-
Lange theory of emotions. This theory said that, when a person felt 
an emotion, what they were feeling was the arousal of their body's 
autonomic nervous system. A classic example of this would be the 
feeling of fear one has on meeting a bear in the woods. According to 
the James-Lange theory, what is labeled as fear is the person's au­
tomatic "fight or flight" response of the sympathetic nervous sys­
tem, which increases the heart and breathing rates. This theory was 
largely discredited because it can be shown that quadriplegic hu­
mans or rats (paralyzed from the neck down and having no feelings 
from their autonomic nervous system) still exhibit and report emo­
tional feelings. It also seems that the body's physiological arousal is 
much too generalized and brief to explain human emotions. 
While our emotions are certainly related to our autonomic 
arousal, it is by no means clear that our thinking and willing and 
other internal mental states are also. When trying to extend his 
theory to human thinking, Skinner gives examples of sensory dis­
crimination, sensory abstraction, and sensory memories as internal 
states that can be related to sensory feeling. But, these do not 
exhaust the inner world of the creative, imaginative, reasoning, 
thinking mind. No one wishes to claim that thinking is not 
influenced by our environment, but is it not rash to suggest that it is 
equal to the environment's effect on our bodies? 
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RATIONALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY To continue our look at the 
limitations of Skinner's view of 
the mind, we will now review several major psychological findings 
that appear to conflict with it. 
The scientists cited would all consider themselves behaviorists 
in the sense that they often use behavior as their prime or exclusive 
dependent variable in scientific research. But they have not ac­
cepted the empirical, blank slate view of man of Skinner's radical 
behaviorism, which converts all talk about mind into descriptions of 
behavior. The following scientific findings can, therefore, be con­
sidered in support of the rationalist tradition in psychology. 
Latent Learning and Cognitive Maps—£. C. Tolman 
One of the earliest attacks on radical behavioristic theories was 
that of E. C. Tolman. After his studies on latent learning Tolman 
decided that people and animals could do things in the apparent 
absence of discriminative stimuli (Tolman, 1948, 1967). In latent 
learning experiments animals are exposed to an environment, but 
are not reinforced for any behavior emitted in that environment. In 
later testing with reinforcement these animals proved to be superior 
to animals that had not previously been exposed to the environ­
ment. This experiment showed that learning was taking place all 
along in the "mind" of the animal. Even when the rats were placed 
on little carts and wheeled through the maze, learning occurred. It 
became apparent, then, that reinforcement is necessary for perfor­
mance but not for learning. 
To explain his rats' abilities to improve by mere exposure to the 
test situation, Tolman developed the concept of "cognitive maps." 
He felt that the animals were forming a map of the environment in 
their heads rather than learning motor responses in the presence of 
certain stimuli. The simple explanation of associating a stimulus and 
a response will not explain how a rat that is wheeled through a 
maze can correctly run through the maze, or how a rat that is 
trained to run through the maze can also swim correctly through it. 
It is apparent that these animals are learning things in the absence of 
discriminative stimuli and their attachments to certain responses. 
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FIGURE 6 
Days 
The results of a latent-learning experiment where animals were re­
warded after a period of non-reward. Their performance showed that they 
had been learning even without reinforcement (after Tolman and Honzik, 
1930). 
Tolman also observed vicarious trial-and-error behavior in 
animals at choice points in their learning tasks. The animal was 
observed to hesitate and visibly compare the alternative stimuli 
before making a choice. The active comparison of discriminative 
stimuli again seems to indicate cognitive processes at work at these 
choice points. 
Insight Learning—Wolfgang Kohler 
Kohler ran a series of experiments during the years 1913-17 on 
the island of Tenerife, off the coast of Africa, which challenged 
American behavioristic psychology (Kohler, 1925). In one experi-
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ment an ape had two sticks, a smaller one (X) that needed to be 
inserted into a larger one (Y) in order to reach food placed some 
distance from the cage. After the ape learned to do this, Kohler took 
the smaller stick (X) and replaced it with a stick larger than the first 
two (Z). Without any hesitation or fumbling, the ape correctly 
placed stick Y into stick Z to get to the food. Skinner's behavioristic 
theory would have expected the ape to initially attempt to place Z 
into Y. Other experiments involved the need to place one or two 
boxes under a hanging banana in order to reach it. While neither of 
these experiments was easily solved by the apes, Kohler interpreted 
their sudden insight into the solution as indicative that the animal 
could survey the situation, think through the possible success of its 
behavior, and then test out various solutions. 
Language Development—Noam Chomsky 
Noam Chomsky (1959) has used research into the develop­
ment of human language as an argument against the strict empiricist 
stance of Skinner. Research has shown that children the world over 
engage in grammatical speech at approximately the same age. This 
suggests that the environment is not the major factor in human 
language development. The child-rearing practices of parents (even 
the presence of mute parents) is not an important factor in language 
development. The major defining factor in a child's ability to use 
language is the age at which he interacts with his speaking envi­
ronment. It appears that children possess a language acquisition 
device (LAD), or more accurately a grammar acquisition device, 
that comes into use at about age two. Humans can also speak and 
understand literally an infinite number of grammatically correct 
sentences. There is no need to be exposed to and then be reinforced 
for every correct pattern of words that will ever be used. 
All of these ideas seem to point rather strongly to the rationalist 
and nativist (innate structures) views of language development. 
Skinner made his empiricist case for language development in Ver­
bal Behavior (1957), but when empirical language acquisition is 
seen in operation, as it is when chimps have been taught to use sign 
language (object + sign + reinforcement), the tremendous contrast 
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between how a child learns language and how a chimp does is 
intensified. This difference strengthens the rationalist's case for 
human language acquisition. 
The Principle of Mass Action—Karl Lashley 
Karl Lashley, a student of John Watson, provided evidence that 
was disconcerting for the staunch associationistic theorists. Lashley 
(1931) trained animals (generally rats) in running a maze or making 
a visual discrimination. He would then destroy a part of the animal's 
cortex, allow it to recover, and then test it to see in what manner its 
performance had been impaired. The outcome of these experiments 
was that the amount of cortex destroyed, not its location, deter­
mined the deterioration in the animal's behavior. In other words, a 
given place in the cortex is not the seat of a particular learned 
performance. (On the basis of this evidence Lashley concluded that 
the cortex acts as a whole with respect to learning (the principle of 
mass action), and that lost brain function can be taken over by other 
areas in the brain (the principle of equipotentiality). 
Lashley's work relates to behaviorism in an important way; 
after his research it was no longer possible to think of the engram, or 
the physical basis for learning, in terms of synaptic connections in 
the cortex. Pavlov and Watson's work had stressed the idea that 
learning was the connection between the incoming sensory stimuli 
and the outgoing responses. These stimulus-response connections 
had to be some place in the interconnections of neurons mediating 
the sensory input and motor output. To find out that the synaptic 
connection is not where the learning "is" was disturbing to the 
behaviorist to say the least. Lashley's work is not particularly 
"rationalistic," but it does say that behavior cannot be thought of as 
simply composed of conditioned stimulus-response relationships, 
but as much more of a holistic, central process on the part of the 
brain. Lashley's work forces the search for the mind, learning, per­
sonality, emotions, thought, motivation, and so on, away from a 
strictly behavioristic, peripheral, environmental emphasis, toward 
the idea that the central processes of the brain are of prime impor­
tance in the mental life and activity of the person. 
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Observational Learning—Albert Bandura 
Albert Bandura (1974) expressed his case against the radical 
behaviorism of psychologists in his presidential address at the 1974 
meeting of the American Psychological Association. 
Originally, conditioning was assumed to occur automatically. 
On closer examination it turned out to be cognitively mediated, 
(p. 124) 
But external consequences, influential as they often are, are not 
the sole determinants of human behavior, nor do they operate 
automatically, (p. 124) 
Bandura feels that the consequences of one's actions serve primarily 
as an information function. By observing the effects of their actions 
people can discern which behaviors are appropriate in which set­
tings. Reinforcement then changes behavior in humans through the 
intervening influence of thought. The consequences of our be­
haviors can also motivate us. Many of the things we do are con­
sciously designed to gain future benefit or to avoid problems. An­
ticipated consequences are usually more effective in changing our 
behavior than actual consequences, and thus partial reinforcement 
is more effective than complete reinforcement. 
It is also obvious from Bandura's research that people can learn 
by observing and not just by experiencing (Bandura, 1971). The 
human mind's capacity to represent modeled behaviors symboli­
cally enables man to acquire new behavior through observation 
without reinforced enactment. The observations serve later as a 
guide for action. Bandura has conducted many experiments on ob­
servational learning, particularly with children. In the typical 
experiment, the subject watches another person perform some ac­
tion. Later the subject's behavior is tested to see how much of the 
model s behavior he will demonstrate. Comparison with control 
group subjects suggests that the learner learns simply by watching 
the model. Bandura's (1965) now famous "Bozo doll" experiment 
is illustrative of observational learning. In this experiment children 
view a film of an adult hitting and kicking a plastic Bozo doll. These 
children learned aggressive responses through the observation of 
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the film and demonstrated a similar aggressiveness when given an 
opportunity to play with a Bozo doll. 
Skinner's theory may explain how similar behavior that a per­
son has previously learned is being prompted by the prospect of 
reward. But it cannot explain how a new response is acquired ob­
servational ly. This learning must be taking place through symbolic 
processes before any responses have been performed and rein­
forced. Bandura believes something is going on inside the organism 
that affects its response to stimuli and influences the value of rein-
forcers. Furthermore, he looks at the human capacity for thought 
and language, human learning without reinforcement, and the gen­
eral planning that guides people's lives rather than specific be­
havioral objectives as further indications that there is a cognitive 
dimension behind human behavior. 
Stage Theory of Development—jean Piaget 
Jean Piaget, the "giant in the nursery" who died in 1980, con­
tributed an enormous legacy to the rationalist position in psychol­
ogy. In his stage theory of intellectual development he emphasized 
that there is a readiness to learn that is provided by the maturation of 
the child. Piaget's stage theory describes how the primitive thought 
of infants gradually develops into mature adult thought. This cogni­
tive development of the child depends on both biological matura­
tion and environmental influences. Piaget has described four major 
stages of development, each of which grows out of the stage pre­
ceding it: the sensorimotor period (0-2 years), the preoperational 
period (2-7 years), the period of concrete operations (7-11 years), 
and the period of formal operations (from 11 years onward). 
In the sensorimotor period the child's intelligence is manifested 
in his actions as he is interacting with his world by sucking, kicking, 
hitting, and shaking. Later in this stage the child will develop the 
concept of object permanence, which has developed when the child 
begins to reach for an object after it has been hidden from view, 
having watched it being hidden. At almost two years of age, the child 
begins to mentally represent the world through images and symbols. 
In the preoperational period the child begins to use words to 
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represent things and is developing the concepts of time and number 
and is learning to put objects in classes. The preoperational mind is 
still egocentric, meaning the child has difficulty seeing a situation 
from another's perspective. 
In the period of concrete operations, children can perform 
some new mental operations. Egocentric thought is not as promi­
nent, and simple mathematical operations like adding and multi­
plying are possible in this period. What is not yet present in the 
child's mind is the ability to do abstract thinking. The hallmark of 
development during this stage occurs when the child learns the 
principle of conservation, the idea that a quantity remains the same 
in spite of changes in its appearance. The child can recognize that 
changing the shape of clay, for example, or dividing it into parts, 
will not change the total amount of clay. 
FIGURE 7 
The ability to conserve volume involves the ability to recognize that 
two equal quantities remain equal even if the volume is redistributed. 
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Finally, in the period of formal operations the child moves from 
concrete operations to formal, operational thinking. At this level, 
children begin to solve problems. Hypotheses are formulated and 
tested, and conclusions are based upon the results. The child's 
thinking has now become more abstract and logical, like that of an 
adult. Thus, the development of the cognitive process is complete. 
Again, as in the case of language development, it appears as if 
the environment plays an important but indirect role in the intel­
lectual growth of the child. Differences in parenting or advanced 
training of the child alter only slightly the structured unfolding of the 
child's intellectual capabilities. Development rests largely on mat­
uration, although it may be hindered by an unfavorable environ­
ment or advanced by a favorable one. Thus, Piaget's theory is a 
weighty, centralist theory and needs to be dealt with by the 
peripheral theory of Skinner. 
SUMMARY In summary, it can be said that Skinner's view of the 
mind has not been supported by evidence from the 
operant conditioning laboratory and runs counter to much psycho­
logical data. Skinner sees all aspects of mental life as a product of 
the environment and physiological states of the body. He has not, 
however produced experimental evidence of primary and secon­
dary reinforcement that would support a conditioning theory of 
mental phenomena. Skinner's view of the mind also fails to account 
adequately for a wide range of impressive psychological data that 
does not support a strictly empirical view of the mind. The nativist 
data of Chomsky and Piaget, and the cognitive implications of the 
research of Bandura, Tolman, and Kohler seem to suggest that while 
Skinner's behaviorism may explain simple, animal or human be­
havior, it fails to explain the complexities of human mental life. As 
Daniel Robinson (1979) put it: 
It is to the credit of Skinner and of those who have adopted his 
program that we now possess an immense catalogue of experi­
mental findings describing the subtle and durable effects of 
"reinforcement contingencies". This part of the overall contribu­
tion is as impressive as it is unimpeachable, but as Skinner him-
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self has moved beyond the data, as he has attempted to include 
under the umbrella of the law of effect the entire range of human 
activities, the Skinnerian system has repeatedly foundered and 
failed, (p. 138) 
THE QUESTION 
OF FREEDOM 
With the publication of Be- yond Freedom and Dignity 
(1971), Skinner's view of human determinism exploded 
upon the public with its denial of human freedom and sug­
gestions for human engineering. Although determinism has a long 
history, the prestige of today's science and the popularity of psy­
chology combined with Skinner's literary forcefulness are present­
ing a strong challenge to the traditional view of human freedom and 
responsibility. That challenge is the focus of this chapter. 
Since some of the greatest minds in history have not resolved 
the issue of freedom and determinism to everyone's satisfaction, 
there is no reason to expect that we could do so in a few pages. 
Consequently we will limit ourselves to an evaluation of Skinner s 
case for determinism in the light of the data of operant conditioning. 
We will also look briefly at some of the practical philosophical 
problems for a deterministic view of human nature. 
WHAT DOES SKINNER BELIEVE Skinner's views of human free-
ABOUT FREEDOM? dom are fairly common knowl-
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edge because of Walden Two (1948) and Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity (1971). To Skinner the belief in a human agent who is the 
initiator of his own behaviors is an illusion. He believes that the 
controlling factor of all human behavior is the environment, or more 
specifically, the contingencies of reinforcement in that person's past 
and present environment. Not only outward behavior, but even 
inner feelings, motivations, reasonings, and rational choices are 
conditioned products of the environment. In Beyond Freedom and 
Dignity (1971) Skinner wrote: 
What is being abolished is autonomous man—the inner man, the 
homunculus, the processing demon, the man defended by the 
literatures of freedom and dignity. 
His abolition has long been overdue. Autonomous man is a 
device used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. 
He has been constructed from our ignorance, and as our under­
standing increases, the very stuff of which he is composed van­
ishes. Science does not dehumanize man, it dehomunculizes 
him. and it must do so if it is to prevent the abolition of the 
human species. To man qua man we readily say good riddance. 
Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real causes of 
human behavior. Only then can we turn from the inferred to the 
observed, from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessi­
ble to the manipulable. (p. 191) 
The determinism of Skinner leaves one with a different kind of 
mechanistic man than )ohn Watson's determinism does. Watson's 
emphasis was on reflex conditioning; it produced a picture of man 
the robot pacing through the activities of the day with the same 
reflex action as that of a knee jerk. Skinner's view of emitted be­
havior, however, leaves a person feeling free and apparently 
choosing much of the behavior he will engage in. But in actuality he 
is just as determined as the reflex man of Watson. 
DETERMINISM OR INFLUENCE? It is difficult to imagine any 
experiment that could be de­
signed to prove the case for determinism (or free will). Would it 
prove determinism to observe that 100% of the people at a certain 
beach wear bathing suits? That represents a perfect correlation 
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between an environment and a behavior, but does it mean that 
those individuals have been determined to wear bathing suits as 
opposed to having chosen to do so? Does it prove determinism to 
demonstrate that when a person's arm is twisted he can be made 
to drink water? Certainly, in my own case, swimming and pain are 
two examples of what I would describe as strongly compelling 
stimuli in determining my behavior. But could I ever demonstrate 
determinism by the mere description of environment and be­
havior? 
It might also be asked whether demonstrating that human be­
havior can be conditioned leads automatically to the conclusion 
that human behavior is so conditioned in real life? Does demon­
strating that a person has no apparent control over some extreme 
stimulus contingencies, mean that in other areas of his life he is also 
determined? I raise these questions to suggest that Skinner has been 
less than cautious in using the results of human and animal condi­
tioning experiments to make pronouncements about human deter­
minism. A careful analysis of the data suggests that influence, not 
determinism, is a more convincing description of what Skinner has 
demonstrated. Human freedom does not mean that a person is not 
influenced by the environment, or that in certain situations he might 
not be determined by the environment. It simply means that the 
persons are agents, capable of making choices about what they do. 
SECONDARY REINFORCEMENT A major feature of Skinner's 
AND COMPLEX BEHAVIOR theorizing is the application of 
his theory of operant condi­
tioning, which was developed by reasoning from relatively simple 
animal behavior to extraordinarily complex human actions. He 
bridges this huge gap by relying heavily upon the concepts of 
shaping, chaining, and secondary reinforcers we discussed in 
chapter 3. A complex behavior is supposedly made up of numerous 
smaller behaviors, and the whole complex function is maintained 
by a steady supply of secondary reinforcers. Although human be­
havior is undoubtedly too complex to spot the multitudes of minute 
conditioning events that shape complex behaviors, if Skinner"s view 
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is accurate, some of the more obvious primary and secondary rein­
forcement contingencies for any behavior ought to be visible. 
To demonstrate, let me ask the question, According to operant 
conditioning theory, why do students attend my classes? Since very 
little human behavior is in the control of primary reinforcers like 
food or water, we must look for frequent secondary reinforcers that 
are maintained by occasional primary reinforcement. My students, 
then, are not attending class because I distribute candy after every 
class; there are easier ways to obtain food. They are attending class 
for what Skinner would consider secondary reinforcement, that is, 
grades, praise, entertainment, and knowledge. 
From what is known of secondary reinforcement in the 
laboratory, there should be a conditioning history for the develop­
ment of these reinforcers. Perhaps in my students' earliest school 
years good grades were rewarded with praise or ice cream, and bad 
grades resulted in punishment. From animal studies it is clear that 
secondary reinforcers (e.g., praise, grades) have to be repeatedly 
paired with other conditioned reinforcers (e.g., money, attention) or 
with primary reinforcers (e.g., food, water) in order to continue their 
effectiveness and prevent the extinction of learned behaviors. But 
my students' class attendance (or any behavior for that matter) does 
not reveal a maintenance of secondary reinforcers by primary rein­
forcement. In fact, human secondary reinforcers are extraordinarily 
strong and resistent to extinction even though possible related pri­
mary reinforcers are far removed in time. Human secondary rein­
forcers, such as conversation, praise, achievement, and others 
appear to be better explained by Bandura's cognitive factors or 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs. 
Other examples from daily human behavior pose similar 
difficulties for the determinist who sees behavior as totally con­
trolled by reinforcement. How does operant conditioning theory 
explain the words a poet chooses when he writes a poem? Can the 
properties of the present and past environments that are determining 
the choice of his next word be identified? Furthermore, any stimulus 
properties found must be shown to be conditioned and uncon­
ditioned reinforcers with the same characteristics as those that the 
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theory of operant conditioning would predict. But such contingen­
cies of reinforcement are not apparent in daily human behavior. 
"REBEL" BEHAVIOR When observing human behavior or re­
flecting on our own, it becomes quite clear 
that much of the time we resist reinforcement or brave certain 
punishment in order to engage in certain behaviors. My students 
have to drag themselves out of bed, face inclement weather, endure 
uncomfortable desks, and fight off sleep in order to attend my 
classes. A champion athlete will rise before the sun, endure hours of 
grueling exercises, and expend much physical and psychological 
energy on his sport. But what reinforcement causes this behavior? A 
few tennis players work for cash, Olympic athletes expect gold 
medals, but most athletes do not win money or gold medals. 
Weekend joggers and eight-year-old little league baseball players 
are not paid either. 
To say that there is a tremendous physical and psychological 
exhileration in the expenditure of energy and the excitement of 
competition ignores the hours of pain and years of grueling practice 
that must occur before these brief exhilarating moments. In fact, it 
does not feel exhilarating to get out of bed in the morning. If operant 
conditioning were accurate in describing human behavior, the 
world would come to a grinding halt since everyone in it would 
follow the path of least resistance by remaining in bed for long 
hours, eating endless meals, and relaxing comfortably all day! Yet 
much of our behavior apparently rebels against this reinforcing 
environment. We must rise above our environment to work and 
play, and this way we build the massive legacy of human achieve­
ment throughout the world. 
In what other way can the actions of some of the great indi­
viduals of history, who have not conformed to the expectations and 
reinforcement contingencies of their day be explained? Their his­
tories reveal refusals to settle for the easy life, or the safe life, or the 
accepted, traditional modes of behavior. In what other way can we 
explain the creative behavior of individuals? Creative behavior 
involves rebelling against the traditional, accepted, praised, and 
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FIGURE 8 
Many human behaviors result in more pain than pleasure. 
This fact is not in line with the operant conditioning theory. 
rewarded ways of thinking and doing things. The creative artist, 
inventor, or scientist may find acceptance later in life or long after 
he is dead, but this is invariably preceded by years of apparently 
unreinforced behavior. In addition, what classroom teacher or 
prison warden has not noticed the "rebel" who does not respond to 
the rewards and punishment set up for him in a token economy? 
Skinner explains all of these examples of rebel behavior by 
pointing out that it is obvious that for some people the tradiitonal 
reinforcements or punishments are not reinforcing or punishing. To 
stay in bed may be reinforcing to you, but not for someone else. To 
lose your job and be sent to prison may be punishment for you, but 
not to a Russian dissident. There are other nontraditional stimuli that 
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must be reinforcing their behaviors. This is called the hidden-
parameters argument because Skinner is saying that there must be 
reinforcers "hidden" out there in the environment, because he 
knows his theory is correct! This is a nice try but it fails both logi­
cally and scientifically. To begin with, Skinner simply tries to ex­
plain away any conceivable evidence against his theory. All that he 
has to do is to say that there is a reinforcer out there someplace for 
every complicated human behavior. We just don't know where it is! 
From this position, Skinner does not produce "evidence" for his 
theory of determinism. He simply claims the reinforcement is out 
there somewhere because otherwise humans would not be engag­
ing in behaviors that they do. The question is, has careful observa­
tion and experimentation revealed such reinforcement systems? The 
answer is no, this hypothesized "hidden reinforcer" is a product of 
his theory, not of his experimental evidence. 
By the hidden-parameters argument, Skinner is again assuming 
the very thing that is in question, namely, whether or not human 
behavior is controlled by the environment. Our objection is that it 
seems as if much human behavior either goes against the obvious 
contingencies of reinforcement or braves certain punishment. Skin­
ner's replies that it is clear that since such reinforcements are not 
reinforcing and such punishments are not punishing, there must be 
other nontraditional reinforcers. Skinner argues that a person would 
not be engaging in these behaviors unless they were being rein­
forced by the environment. But the argument is circular. Is all 
human behavior controlled by reinforcements from the environ­
ment? To argue by using hidden parameters instead of evidence 
does not answer the question. And thus, the fact remains that much 
of human behavior stands in apparently clear contradiction of Skin­
ner's view of determinism in man. 
THE LOSS OF TRUTH Although the lack of evidence for Skin­
ner's view is a serious weakness, that is 
not the only problem. If one accepts Skinner's determinism, certain 
of its ramifications must also be accepted. Skinner's behaviorism 
tells us that a person's past and present environment is responsible 
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for all of his behavior. This means that if Skinner encounters a 
devout Christian or a devout atheist, he would say that their envi­
ronments had led them to these different ideas and behavior pat­
terns. If a fierson identifies himself as a Republican as opposed to a 
Democrat, according to Skinner it is because he has a complex 
determining background that includes the political preferences of 
his parents, his yearly income, and his religious preference. 
In these examples it is not bec ause of a search for truth that a 
person ends up with a religious or political preference, but because 
of environment. One cannot really know what is true in any area of 
know/edge. For example, the reader of this book cannot know 
whether my evaluation of Skinner's behaviorism is true or not, since 
it is merely the product of my particular educational and religious 
background. 
Although this inability to discover truth is not troublesome to 
Skinner, it must at least be pointed out that it applies to his own 
teachings also. If determinism is true, then every idea that comes 
from Skinner's mind is a product of his particular environment. If he 
had experienced a completely different past history, he could now 
be teaching in defense of human freedom and not against it! There­
fore, why should anyone believe what Skinner says about deter­
minism? His has not been an unbiased, scientific search for truth, 
but behaviors and ideas conditioned by the environment! It is not 
that truth does not exist or that it is not present in the teachings of 
people. The problem is that we could never know whether we had 
found truth. 
THE LOSS OF RESPONSIBILITY Another difficulty with Skin­
ner's behaviorism is that its 
view of responsibility seems unrealistic and unrelated to daily life. 
The title of Skinner's book. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, means 
that he believes that human freedom does not exist and con­
sequently neither does human dignity as a product of the credit we 
give individuals for good and distinguished behavior. If Skinner is 
right, then we cannot hold criminals responsible for their bad be­
havior. for they have only been conditioned by their environments. 
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It would be interesting to know what might go on in the mind of 
Skinner if ever he would be robbed. Like any of us he would proba­
bly feel that the criminal should not be robbing him. If the criminal 
pointed a gun at him, he might say, "Please, don't shoot me!" Such 
a plea would imply that the criminal had freedom, since Skinner 
would be holding him responsible for the robbery and asking not to 
be shot, as if the criminal had a choice in the matter. This example 
would not be convincing to Skinner because he would say that our 
thoughts about other's freedoms are simply wrong, his own in­
cluded. But the point is that all of us (including Skinner) would find 
it so objectionable to no longer hold anyone responsible for his own 
behavior that we simply would refuse to live that way. It is difficult 
to imagine a world in which we would not hold others responsible if 
they refused to give us our pay check, show up for work on time, 
slop killing people, and other such things. It is not that the environ­
ment doesn't influence what a person does; we would simply find it 
impossible to shift the entire responsibility for what every person 
does to the environment. 
Skinner, however, does try to be consistent with his deter­
ministic beliefs. In an article entitled, "A Case History in the Sci­
entific Method." Skinner (1961) describes some of his past experi­
ments as a way of showing how he was conditioned to behave by 
his environment and the animal subjects he used. He also used to 
chart his cumulative professional behavior in his office just as he did 
with his animals. Many times in his writings he uses words that refer 
to himself as having been conditioned by his past. In his autobiog­
raphy he says that his wife "reinforced" him appropriately when he 
taught the psychology of literature (Skinner, 1967). When asked 
why he bothers to write a book if all behavior is determined any­
way, he says that to answer that, you have to look into the rein­
forcement history of a behaviorist! 
But in spite of his protests Skinner often continues to use the 
language of freedom and dignity, almost as if real communication 
about human beings cannot be carried on without it. In Beyond 
Freedom and Dignity (1971) he seems forced to use language in 
which he attributes part of the person's behavior to his own initiative: 
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When an individual engages in intentional design of a cultural 
practice. ... (p. 210) 
He is controlled by his environment, but we must remember that 
it is an environment largely of his own making, (p. 215) 
To refuse to control. ... (p. 5) 
Is it not also inconsistent with belief in determinism for Skinner to 
urge his listening and reading audience to rise up and change the 
world with behavioral technology? His last sentence in Beyond 
Freedom and Dignity (1971) challenges us, "We have not yet seen 
what man can make of man" (p. 206). This is paradoxical; how can 
Skinner put man into the determined, natural order and then ask 
him to control that order? How can a totally determined organism 
transcend his environmental determinism to take charge of an 
environment that totally determines him? Yet Skinner repeatedly 
suggests that human beings can and should exploit his scientific 
knowledge of mechanized man in order to raise themselves to new 
heights of kindness, intelligence, and happiness. 
Albert Bandura (1974) has given the same criticism of Skinner's 
determinism. 
To contend, as environmental determinists often do, that people 
are controlled by external forces and then to advocate that they 
redesign their society by applying behavioral technology under­
mines the basic premise of the argument. If humans were in fact 
incapable of influencing their own actions, they would describe 
and predict environmental events but hardly exercise any inten­
tional control over them. (p. 136) 
The criticism that Skinner fails to live as he is determined may 
seem superficial. In fact, when pressed for why he lives with a 
certain amount of unconscious recognition of his own and other's 
freedom, Skinner merely has to say, "I am determined to do so." 
And yet, maybe our behaviors speak more loudly than our words 
about our beliefs. If a man tells me he does not believe that it is 
possible to gather any truth from sensory experience, and I later 
observe him picking a fly out of his hamburger, what am I to con­
clude? Is he just going through the motions of plucking an imaginary 
fly out of his imaginary hamburger so that he will not have to 
THE QUESTION OF FREEDOM • 79 
imagine eating it? Or do his actions show that no matter what he 
says he really does trust in what his senses tell him? On the level of 
daily life, Skinner, too, finds it difficult to live the "truth" he teaches. 
It seems reasonable to gauge what people really think as much by 
their behavior as by their theoretical pronouncements! 
In summary, readers of Skinner's works ought to give careful 
consideration to what his work on operant conditioning has and has 
not demonstrated. Credit needs to be given to Skinner for develop­
ing an enormous amount of data that has revealed the important 
role of the environment on human behavior. When the nature ver­
sus nurture question is raised, one can be confident that a strong 
influence of the environment has been demonstrated. But what has 
been both demonstrated in the laboratory and observed in the world 
at large is influence, not determinism. Those who believe in the 
freedom and dignity of man need not lose confidence because of 





OF VRLUE AND CONTROL 
Undoubtedly, one of the major sources of the resis­
tance to Skinner's be- haviorism is the public's fear 
that it might work! A popular * book, (and movie) A 
Clockwork Orange (1962), helped heighten the public's fear of the 
power of science. Alex, whose name means "without law," is the 
lead character in A Clockwork Orange. He is a young gang leader 
who commits one horrible crime after another. Living in a world 
that contains millions of people like Alex makes normal citizens 
desperate to accept any psychological solution offered. But the 
psychoengineering offered in the book seems so repugnant and 
degrading to those who believe in human freedom and dignity that 
one is left wondering if it is wrong to apply it, even to a person like 
Alex. 
In great contrast to A Clockwork Orange, Skinner's Walden 
Two (1948) tells of a very pleasant community where the measures 
of control are not visible and where everyone is healthy and happy. 
Skinner's positive description makes everyone (except philosophers 
like the book's Professor Castle) desire to move in. 
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Skinner should be credited for thinking beyond the laboratory 
to the problems facing the real world. Too often scientists are 
wrapped up in trivial research that produces dozens of scholarly 
publications (and perhaps tenure!) but does not relate to the larger 
world. Not that all science has to be applied, but, without applica­
tion, science can become a monumental exercise in trivia. In con­
trast to such irrelevant research, Skinner (1970) dreams of a better 
world: 
It is hard to imagine a world in which people live together with­
out quarrelling, maintain themselves by producing the food, 
shelter, and clothing they need, enjoy themselves and contribute 
to the enjoyment of others in art, music, literature, and games, 
consume only a reasonable part of the resources of the world and 
add as little as possible to its pollution, bear no more children 
than can be raised decently, continue to explore the world 
around them and discover better ways of dealing with it, and 
come to know themselves accurately and, therefore, manage 
themselves effectively, (p. 204) 
In order to accomplish all of this, Skinner believes that the prin­
ciples of operant conditioning need to be applied on a larger 
scale. 
Unfortunately (according to Skinner) the literatures of freedom 
and dignity and the public's fears of loss of freedom and unscrupu­
lous control are blocking the successful application of this kind of 
technology. This is one reason why Skinner attacks the writings of 
C. S. Lewis. Skinner believes he must displace the "unscientific" 
views of man with his "scientific" one and thus calm the fears of 
control. He writes (1971): 
It (technology of behavior) will not solve our problems, however, 
until it replaces traditional prescientific views, and these are 
strongly entrenched, (p. 25) 
In this chapter, we will look at both the possibility of exercising the 
type of control Skinner advocates and the value questions inherent 
in this type of behavioral control. We will begin with an examina­
tion of the possibility of behavioral control. 
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF In spite of all of the laboratory 
BEHAVIORAL TECHNOLOGY success in applying operant con­
ditioning methods to animals, 
serious questions remain about the feasibility of effectively applying 
these techniques to a variety of complex human functions, let alone 
to society at large. The main attempts that have been made are in 
the area of behavior therapy, and even there, some major limita­
tions have become apparent. 
Behavioral therapists' greatest successes have tended to come 
with individuals suffering from rather specific symptoms of a cir­
cumscribed nature. A variety of phobias, for example, have been 
shown to respond well to behavior therapy (Bandura, Blanchard, 
and Ritter, 1969; Wolpe, 1963, 1969). Behavioral techniques have 
also proven effective in weight loss programs (Penick, Filion, Fox 
and Stunkard, 1971; Stuart, 1971) and in curtailing smoking be­
havior (McFall, 1970; Nolan, 1968). Some progress has also been 
demonstrated in the treatment of withdrawn and even autistic chil­
dren (Louvass, 1967; Schopler, Brehm, Kinsbourne, and Reichler, 
1971), unmotivated delinquents (Bandura, 1969; Bednar, Zelhart, 
Greathouse, and Weinberg, 1970), and chronic schizophrenics 
(Atthowe & Krasner, 1968; Ayllon and Azrin, 1965). As we move 
from the more circumscribed symptoms to disturbances of the total 
personality, however, the effectiveness of behavioral methods to 
radically alter personality is increasingly called into question. 
While behavior therapy has been used to reduce odd behaviors 
and promote greater cooperation on psychiatric wards, it has not 
been effective in resolving the confused thinking of psychotics or 
leading them back to emotional health or maturity. In this regard, 
behavior therapy for emotional problems might be compared to 
taking aspirin for a fever. It works, and lesser problems may be 
resolved, but it may not touch the source of the fever. 
Another limitation of behavioral approaches is in getting 
people to cooperate. In hospital token economies, about 20% of 
chronic schizophrenics refuse to take part in the token economy 
and thus fail to emit behaviors that can be reinforced; in prisons, 
token economies are often resisted by means of organized strikes or 
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sit-ins (Geiser, 1976). It seems that if people know they are being 
controlled, they resist it. The inherent desire and ability to exercise 
one's freedom could explain this failure. 
Another consistent weakness of token economies is their failure 
to transfer from the treatment program to the normal living envi­
ronment. Since the outside environment has a different reinforce­
ment system, the behaviors learned in therapy may not continue in 
other situations. Consider a prisoner, for example, who has learned 
to avoid fights in a prison through use of a token economy program. 
When he is released he may learn that fighting outside the prison 
produces its own reinforcement. Consequently, unless the larger 
environment can be controlled, token economies will be of limited 
value. Such limitations suggest that applying behavioristic technol­
ogy to the whole of society is impractical no matter how well devel­
oped the techniques become. Finley Carpenter (1974) in his book 
The Skinner Primer remarks: 
The main crack in the tight Skinnerian system occurs when Skin­
ner begins to extend his principles to behavior beyond the 
laboratory, (p. 95) 
Operant conditioning can control the behavior of simple or­
ganisms because it is carried out in a controlled environment with 
knowledge of the reinforcement history of the organism, a restricted 
range of behavior for the organism, and the ability to constantly 
monitor the organism's behavior and deliver immediate reinforce­
ment. Imagine the difficulty in even the smallest of societies, how­
ever, in controlling the minds and behaviors of all of its citizens! 
How does one arrange reinforcers in order to control the minds of 
everybody if the controller cannot observe what each person is 
thinking or feeling at a given moment? We can observe behavior, 
but one s behavior does not always relate to the thoughts and emo­
tions that have to be shaped and controlled. Even if it were possible 
to control such inner states, it would be necessary to have a 
controller for every person. And what controller would be prepared 
to monitor every behavior and deliver immediate reinforcement? 
Walden Two seems to run very smoothly with no apparent 
controllers only because there are few major behaviors being con-
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trolled. Everyone in Walden Two worked, for example, because he 
received labor credits. But what controlled the hundreds of daily 
inner behaviors of anger, laziness, jealousy, rebellion, or creativity? 
These are apparently assumed by Skinner to be smoothly under the 
control of a society whose members have had all of these inner 
states conditioned by the proper child development conditioning 
procedures. But is this possible? Skinner assumes that with a prop­
erly controlled upbringing, the whole society would just "naturally" 
begin to function as a behaviorist would desire, with each person 
doing and saying the right thing at the right time to reinforce 
everyone's behavior! There is nothing that has been done in the rat 
laboratory, the token economy, or communal living situations to 
suggest that this type of behavioral engineering could ever function 
in this way. 
Our previous discussion about the impossibility of starting or 
running a Walden-Two society assumes that the behavioristic model 
of conditioned man may be true. If it is not, and if humans have 
significant degrees of freedom and self motivation, there is no way 
Walden Two can work! An operantly-conditioned childhood will not 
succeed unless the infant is born with a blank slate and does not 
possess a potential for free choice. One also wonders why Skinner 
has never attempted to establish his own Walden Two. I do not sense 
that what is needed is a younger man to pioneer the community, or a 
few more years to work out the "bugs" in the theory, or an end to the 
public resistance to the idea of control. A careful analysisof Skinner's 
view of the person suggests that what is needed is a theory of 
personality that more accurately fits human nature and the human 
condition. This is not to say that behaviorism will not find significant 
success in some types of counseling or limited aspects of social 
engineering. But Walden Two, like most Utopias, will never exist 
except between the covers of a book and in dreams. 
VALUE AND ETHICS Any discussion about the application of a 
scientific technology like behaviorism in­
evitably leads to a discussion about value judgments. Even though 
we have questioned the feasibility of widespread social engineer-
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ing, it is interesting to look at some of the problems raised if such 
control were possible. With a technology in hand, one has to decide 
what goals it should have and what, if any, boundaries are placed 
on its use. 
Consider the problem facing any counselor. How is he to de­
cide the optimum in human personality or behavior toward which 
he should guide his clients? A behavior modification expert has to 
decide whether homosexuality is acceptable or not, and whether or 
not introverted behavior is acceptable. Today's psychologists gen­
erally say that the goal is whatever the client chooses, and that 
whatever behavior harms the client or others is unacceptable. But 
these generalizations do not answer the value question. What tells 
you that the client should decide the goal of therapy, or by what 
value structure do you decide what is harmful to the client or 
others? Most counselors make value choices every day without 
thinking about the source of those values. 
The problem of picking values to guide a technology is greatly 
magnified when we consider the possibility of a behavioral en­
gineer redesigning society. How would the designers of Walden 
Two choose the kinds of human personalities to develop even if 
they could exercise such complete control? What thoughts and ac­
tions and professions are to be conditioned into the community? 
And according to what value system did Skinner decide that in 
Walden Two fashion consciousness was not desirable in women or 
that early marriage was good. How were any of the thousands of 
decisions that would shape the future Utopia made? 
A naturalistic philosophy like Skinner's behaviorism can only 
arbitrarily decide on a value structure for guidance; it can never 
insist that any other set of values based on different arbitrary deci­
sions is wrong. This fact shows the relativism in the moral behavior 
of a secular culture and the paralysis of the "guidance" voice of 
science. In the famous Rogers-Skinner debate (Rogers and Skinner, 
1956) Rogers remarked about the values dilemma of the behavioral 
engineer, "The value or purpose that gives meaning to a particular 
scientific endeavor must always lie outside of the endeavor" (p. 16)-
In other words, even if behavioral technology could produce the 
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massive changes it claims, it could never rightfully say anything 
about whether the technology should be used or to what ends it 
should be used. 
In order to understand Skinner's answer concerning his source 
of value in a deterministic system, you must realize that he does not 
intend to rise out of determinism to "choose" his values. The values 
he or anyone else may choose are already determined by environ­
ment. In a sense Skinner tells his critics not to worry about the 
choice of values because their environment has already chosen for 
them. 
In Skinner's view, values are automatically produced in the 
evolving organism. Whatever the organism prefers or finds rein­
forcing is to be considered valuable because these things have 
obviously allowed the organism to survive. Since I exist today as 
opposed to being extinct, my preferences should be considered 
valid value judgments. For Skinner, the one ultimate value is the 
survival of the human culture. He writes (1969), "Whether we like it 
or not, survival is the value by which we shall be judged. The 
culture which takes its survival into account is most likely to sur­
vive" (p. 46). 
Looking at Skinner's view that value is that which is reinforcing 
and aids the survival of man, we can conclude that he believes that 
whatever is, is good and ought to exist. If a single behavior or an 
entire culture exists, then it must contain a reinforcing value system 
and is therefore good. If it is, it is reinforcing; it must be good. 
In saying that what is, is good, Skinner seems to be arguing that 
we need not be completely agnostic about what is ethical and 
valuable. All that we have to do is to look at our present set of values 
and observe what appears to be working and what is not. After all, if 
our culture has survived thus far, it must have much good in its 
present consensus of value. If it contains too many "bad" behaviors, 
it will soon die as a culture. But, if someone searches for value by 
looking at his culture's values to decide what has worked and what 
has not, he is already using a hidden value system in order to obtain 
a value system. By what values will I measure what has "worked"? 
To assert that anything that exists has value because it has 
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survived means that every existent behavior and every culture is of 
value; this is highly debatable. Can we look at our own lives or our 
own culture and make that statement? Philosopher Francis Schaeffer 
comments appropriately on Skinner's basis for value and ethics in 
his booklet Back to Freedom and Dignity (1972): 
Skinner does not seem to notice that he has gotten himself into a 
logical box. Ultimately, what he is saying reduces to whatever is 
is right, and, if whatever is is right, then there is no value over 
against which one can judge anything as good or bad. If it is, it is 
good. And if everything that is is good, then any concept of bad is 
either illogical or trivial. Neither a man like Skinner nor a man 
like George Wald has any reason why the survival of the race is 
desirable. 
Within the Skinnerian system there are no ethical controls. 
There is no boundary limit to what can be done by the elite in 
whose hands control resides, (p. 40) 
In considering the practical problem of using Skinner's system 
of value to guide a future Walden Two, it can be seen that essen­
tially he has no value system to offer. He would have to make 
decisions as to the goals and values of the culture by trying to 
discern what would promote the survival of the culture. In the back 
of his mind, he must already have a hidden set of values to tell him 
what he means by survival (the survival of physical structures? per­
sonality traits? religious ideals?). He must also develop a set of 
values to weigh the survival of his culture against the survival of 
other existing, competing cultures, the good of one member of his 
community rather than another, and the good of the individual 
versus the good of the community. It hardly seems conceivable that 
Skinner s basis for value could guide either long range planning or 
the day to day decisions of Walden Two. 
The Question of Control 
If there is doubt about the ability of a science to establish 
guidelines for the use of its technologies, questions and fears are 
immediately raised about unscrupulous or despotic control meas­
ures. But since behavioral technology does not utilize punishment 
and says that all mental states can be conditioned, Skinner says that 
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fears of 1984 are unfounded. His behavioral technology should 
produce a world in which everyone would be controlled to feel 
free, be happy, act kindly, and do all the right things. It would be a 
control that would never be felt or resisted. 
Even though this kind of control would theoretically not "feel 
bad," it seems to be feared more than the punishing, repressive kind 
because it involves mind control. At least the slave knows he is a 
slave and, therefore, has some dignity and freedom in spite of his 
chains. But in Skinner's world even that freedom would be lost; we 
would be smiling, happy robots. 
In C. S. Lewis' The Silver Chair (1953), a good prince, who is a 
prisoner of the wicked queen, has had his mind altered so that he 
"willingly" serves her for twenty-three hours a day. But for one hour 
each day he awakes from his control as from a bad dream and has to 
be restrained. During his hour of mental freedom he anguishes over 
what she has done to him. Part of his horror is the realization that at 
the end of the hour he will again lose the awareness of who he 
really is and begin again to serve the wicked queen. Not even an 
hour of freedom would exist in Skinner's system. We fear his kind of 
control because supposedly we would not know enough to feel 
unhappy or resent being controlled. 
Skinner's answer to all of these fears is a simple one. There is 
no freedom to lose. You are already being controlled now by your 
environment! Government, education, parents, and peer groups 
shape and control your behavior (usually in an unenjoyable, aver-
sive fashion). Do not worry about losing what you do not possess. 
But this is not a very comforting answer to those who do be­
lieve in freedom and the very real possibility of losing that freedom 
in a Skinnerian world. When they imagine Skinner's world in oper­
ation, they generally see a small group of controllers shaping the 
lives of the masses. They believe that in order to set up a tightly 
controlled, deterministic system you have to have your planners 
and controllers free of the system, to stand outside in order to 
control its functioning. The planners and controllers then become 
an elite group that holds the destiny of the masses in their hands. It is 
this kind of picture that is questioned. 
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What qualifies these individuals to be controllers? What makes 
them so good or so knowledgeable that they can successfully do this 
job? Have they lived such model lives that they can be trusted with 
such power? Is their knowledge so great that they can shape the 
destiny of the human race? Do they have all the knowledge of 
human function and needs as well as the grace to use this knowl­
edge compassionately? Do they have knowledge of all the con­
tingencies of reinforcement affecting a human being and of all 
possible shaping programs that can work in an entire society? Do 
our government leaders, or leading scientists, or peers live such 
model lives and possess such knowledge that we can turn this kind 
of power over to them? Those who believe in freedom say no. 
Skinner's answer to this fear is again very simple and based on 
his assumption of determinism in man. He says that there would be 
no elite group of controllers in a future Walden Two. Everyone 
controls everyone else's behavior right now. The same controllers 
and controlling situations that exist now would also exist in Walden 
Two. Government leaders may control the populace, but they 
would be controlled by voting and other relevant behaviors of the 
populace. The teacher may control the class, but she is controlled 
by her students' behaviors. A scientist may be in charge in a 
laboratory, but his behavior is controlled by the particles or the 
animals he studies. There is a popular magazine cartoon of two rats 
in a Skinner Box. Looking up at the researcher, one rat is saying to 
the other, "Boy, have I got this guy conditioned! Every time I press 
the bar down, he drops in a piece of food!" To Skinner, this cartoon 
is true. The scientist may be conditioning the rat, but the rat is 
likewise conditioning the scientist. 
Skinner says we should not fear unscrupulous control in a 
Walden Two because the controllers would be countercontrolled 
by the populace. In Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) Skinner 
emphasizes this countercontrol. "He is indeed controlled by his 
environment, but we must remember that it is an environment 
largely of his own making" (p. 205). This is a way of saying that we 
are controllers, too, because we are a part of the environment. 
It is a legitimate question, though, as to whether everyone has 
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FIGURE 9 
"Boy, have I got this guy conditioned! Every time I press the bar down, 
he drops in a piece of food." Used by permission of Jester of Columbia 
University. 
the same opportunity to countercontrol. It does not seem that the 
"followers" could ever be given the necessary tools and the techni­
cal know-how to control the "leaders". To Skinner this counter-
control assumes the position of a "law of nature" that operates 
perfectly without our intervention. But, I can imagine that my 
screams of pain could keep a bully from breaking my arm, but not 
keep him from bending the arm just so far. Of what consolation is 
my countercontrolling scream? It is hard to imagine that his muscles 
and my screams are equivalent control stimuli. 
For many reasons then, if it were possible to control a society, 
we should be concerned about the application of behavioral 
technology. If freedom really exists, Skinner's technology would 
have no guarantees of ethical restraint and guidance. An elite group 
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would have to be set up outside of the controlled system. Con­
trollers would share the very faults they wish to cure us of. Counter-
control would be a myth. Skinner, who does not believe in freedom, 
would not have to worry about any of these objections. For this 
reason, his writings have not been reassuring to the reading public. 
Given his assumptions, he does not have to come up with ethical 
plans or built-in restraints against unscrupulous controllers. His 
ideas are shielded by a deterministic box of his own construction. 
It should be said that the mere existence of a technology does 
not justify its application. Even if someone could apply Skinner's 
technology to society, the tremendous doubts about the determinis­
tic model that underlies behavioral engineering indicate that it 
would be applied without adequate safeguards and without the 
needed countercontrol. There is also a danger that human freedom 
could be retarded by massive doses of extrinsic reinforcement. 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that intensive extrinsic rein­
forcement tends to turn play into work, that is, what you used to do 
because of intrinsic motivation (play), you now will only do for 
extrinsic reinforcement (work). Perhaps the direction that psychol­
ogy should pursue is to develop the internal motivation of individu­
als and teach them how to use extrinsic reinforcers, as opposed to a 
massive attempt to control the whole of society with a Walden Two 
system. 
SKINNER'S ANSWERS 
TO KlS CRITICS 
The last four chapters have discussed the serious limita­
tions of Skinner's under- CS standing of human nature. 
Skinner is not oblivious to O these criticisms; he responds 
by saying that a fuller understanding of his laboratory findings will 
answer the doubts of his more philosophically minded critics. 
Skinner's critics (Wheeler, 1973) contend, however, that the issues 
are not the kind that can be resolved by pointing to scientific data; 
they insist that Skinner uses assumptions for facts and then makes 
grandiose pronouncements about the nature of man from selective 
data. 
A look at Skinner's interactions with his critics suggests that 
very little real communication is going on between them. Reading 
the Rogers and Skinner (1956) debate, for example, makes it clear 
that while each presents his arguments well, they fail to win be­
cause they are speaking from such different underlying assump­
tions. Although Skinner's answers are reasonable within his radical 
behavioristic view of things, they really do not resolve the prob­
lems Rogers raises from his phenomenological perspective. The 
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best way to acquaint the reader with the problems of the dialogue 
however, is to let Skinner speak for himself. Skinner's responses to 
the following objections should help clarify his stand and demon­
strate some of the problems of communication between Skinner 
and his critics. 
SKINNER SAYS THAT HUMANS Skinner denies that his be-
ARE MECHANIZED ROBOTS haviorism describes human 
beings as automatons. Al­
though this might accurately describe the determinism of the 
classical conditioning theory of Watson in which stimuli elicit re­
sponses in a reflex fashion, Skinner does not view his theory this 
way. He writes: 
But stimuli do not elicit operant responses; they simply modify 
the probability that responses will be emitted. They do so be­
cause of the contingencies of reinforcement in which they have 
played a part, and they may act in combination with other con­
ditions, possibly but not necessarily to the point at which a re­
sponse occurs. This is a far different role from that of the eliciting 
stimulus in a reflex, (p. 245) 
In other words, Skinner says we should not confuse his theory with a 
theory that builds all human behavior out of reflexes. Skinner agrees 
that most human behavior is of the operant kind, that is, behaviors 
emitted by the organism at "will" and not elicited by some stimulus. 
But emitted behaviors, according to Skinner, are no less determined 
than elicited behaviors. They just appear to be emerging by the 
choice of the organism. In actuality, they are being controlled by the 
reinforcing environment. 
Since the feelings and thoughts of a person are also controlled 
by the environment, the person may have all the experiences of 
feeling free choices, motivation behind behavior, and creative 
thoughts, but in actuality these feelings of freedom are illusions. 
Therefore, human behavior has none of the appearances or feelings 
of automated behavior. But, to Skinner we are nonetheless con­
trolled. If we were to visit a future Walden Two, its inhabitants 
would not appear in any way mechanized or controlled in their 
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behavior. According to Skinner they would feel exactly as people 
always have, except perhaps a little happier. 
AND DESTROY HIS FREEDOM theories have not recognized 
his behavioral technology would destroy man as man along with 
human freedom. Skinner's answer to this objection is that you can­
not destroy something that is not there in the first place. Human 
nature and human freedom simply do not exist. Our only evidence 
that they exist is the presence of feelings of freedom and creative 
thought and language. But these are only products of the environ­
ment. Behaviorism does not take these away; it merely describes 
them for what they really are. Skinner (1974) writes: 
A science of behavior has been said to dehumanize man because 
it is reductionistic. It is said to deal with one kind of fact as if it 
were a different kind—as is done, for example, by physiological 
psychology. But behaviorism does not move from one dimen­
sional system to another. It simply provides an alternative ac­
count of the same facts. It does not reduce feelings to bodily 
states; it simply argues that bodily states are and always have 
been what are felt. (p. 265) 
A major criticism concerns the weight Skinner seems to put on 
the scientific analysis of thought and feeling. He is claiming that his 
science has successfully explained where thoughts, intentions, and 
emotions come from as well as their relationship to the environ­
ment. But this is simply not the case. Skinner has extrapolated his 
findings on animals and simple behaviors and applied them to the 
complex world of a person's inner experience. In very vague and 
sketchy descriptions he "guesses" how the environment might pro­
duce everything from self-awareness to the great literature of the 
world. If Skinner is wrong, and human nature and freedom are real 
(as evidence leads us to suspect), then his behaviorism is reduc­




Supposedly what is meant by 
this criticism is that Skinner's 
the whole of human nature, and 
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SKINNER DENIES Skinner does not deny the 
THE EXISTENCE OF THE MIND existence of an inner realm of 
thought and emotions. What he 
does deny is the common interpretation of these feelings as coming 
from some mysterious entity called the mind or soul or self or any 
other name we wish to give it. Skinner's radical behaviorism does 
not deny mental states like methodological behaviorism or logical 
positivism, which refuse to consider them. He says that what is felt, 
or introspectively observed is not some nonphysical world of con­
sciousness, mind, or mental life. It is only a product of the body's 
interaction with the environment. Skinner comments on this (1974): 
In the sense in which we say that a person is conscious of his 
surroundings, he is conscious of states or events in his body; he is 
under their control as stimuli. ... A person becomes conscious 
in a different sense when a verbal community arranges con­
tingencies under which he not only sees an object but sees that 
he is seeing it. In this special sense, consciousness or awareness 
is a social product. ... No special kind of mind stuff is assumed. 
A physical world generates both physical action and the physical 
conditions within the body to which a person responds when a 
verbal community arranges the necessary contingencies, (pp. 
241-42) 
Once again Skinner's view of the mind is highly speculative 
and will find little acceptance without the support of further re­
search. Skinner's ideas have done little to discredit the more 
rationalistic approaches to explaining the mind, which show evi­
dence of a much smaller role for the environment in the develop­
ment and functioning of the human mind. 
SKINNER CONSIDERS Skinner does not con-
CONCEPTS OF VALUE AND ETHICS sider values and moral 
IRRELEVANT behavior irrelevant in a 
practical sense; he cer­
tainly has moral concern and makes value decisions in every-day 
life. He also believes that counseling and behavioral engineering 
require a set of values and an explicit ethical system. He feels, 
however, that these values are not derived from a "god out there" or 
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from some built-in motivation toward the good. What we call good 
or valuable is a product of the reinforcing environment. Ultimately, 
we call those actions good that are reinforcing to us. A good per­
sonality trait is one that is reinforcing to you. A valuable person to 
have in the community is one who contributes to the survival of the 
community. Skinner (1974) says: 
the behavior we call moral or just is a product of special kinds of 
social contingencies arranged by governments, religions, eco­
nomic systems, and ethical groups. We need to analyze those 
contingencies if we are to build a world in which people behave 
morally and justly, and a first step in that direction is to dismiss 
morality and justice as personal possessions, (pp. 268-69) 
Skinner (1974) feels that the admirable moral qualities in us are 
a product of the countercontrol of others. 
When we ask why a person is benevolent, devoted, compassion­
ate, or public spirited, we find ourselves examining the effect his 
behavior has on others. .. . The consequences responsible for 
benevolent, devoted, compassionate, or public-spirited behavior 
are forms of countercontrol, and when they are lacking, these 
much-admired features of behavior are lacking, (p. 210) 
Skinner's answer tells us why many people behave in good and 
moral ways, but it does not really tell us how we can know what is 
good and moral behavior. To say that good and moral behavior is 
that which is reinforcing describes not just good but all repetitive 
behavior. According to Skinner, if it was not reinforcing, the be­
havior would not exist. But how does he know it is wrong for a man 
in the street to steal a woman's purse? If the man keeps doing it, we 
must assume that he finds it reinforcing. To say that good behavior is 
that which is reinforced leads to saying that purse snatching in many 
instances may be good. Skinner does argue that such acts are not 
ultimately reinforcing (if the man gets caught and goes to jail). But 
that doesn't answer the question as to why purse snatching or any 
immoral act does not become extinct on the earth because of lack of 
ultimate reinforcement. The history of our planet should tell us that 
bad behaviors have not decreased at all in the last few thousand 
years! 
98 • B. F. SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM 
While Skinner does not consider value and ethics irrelevant, he 
lacks an adequate foundation for discussing or making moral deci­
sions. What if the victim of the purse snatcher wonders whether it is 
moral for her to shoot the thief? What would Skinner say to her 
about the morality of her act? Is it even possible to provide her with 
information about the ultimate consequences of her act on the sur­
vival of the community? 
TRUTH IS UNDISCOVERABLE If everything a person says 
GIVEN SKINNER'S DETERMINISM has been conditioned by his 
background, then we cannot 
know that what he says is true. If he had a different background, 
then he would be teaching some other position. If we apply Skin­
ner's logic to his own teachings, for example, we could ask why he 
(or anyone else for that matter) should believe that his teachings on 
radical behaviorism are true. Ultimately, we could not say they 
were true but rather that we have been conditioned to believe they 
are true! 
Skinner deals with this criticism in Verbal Behavior (1957) 
by pointing out all the complicated research supporting his 
theories. But Skinner's choosing to run certain experiments in cer­
tain ways and with certain interpretations of the data are also de­
termined. Why did he choose to perform his research on animals, 
for example? Did that not shape his findings? Consequently, how 
can he know his research points toward truth in understanding 
humans? 
Skinner (1957) comments on this: 
But have I told him the truth: Who can say? A science of verbal 
behavior probably makes no provision for truth or certainty 
(though we cannot even be certain of that), (p. 456) 
He says, speaking of scientific knowledge (Skinner, 1974), 
There is a special sense in which it could be 'true' if it yields the 
most effective action possible. ... a proposition is 'true' to the 
extent that with its help the listener responds effectively to the 
situation it describes, (p. 259) 
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It can be seen by these quotes that Skinner avoids discussing truth as 
absolute. The only definition for truth that determinism leaves is 
"that which is effective," or "that which works." But this definition 
is meaningless unless we can know what "effective" actions are. 
How can we know what an effective action is unless we already 
have some truth about effective actions? 
Skinner cannot satisfactorily answer the problem of the loss 
of truth because no answer is possible unless we assume that the 
universe and all its inhabitants just naturally evolve toward a 
truth that works. This still does not tell us if our knowledge at 
any particular moment is true until long after we raise the ques­
tion, and so it leaves us suspended over the gaping chasm of skep­
ticism. 
SKINNER'S BEHAVIORAL ENGINEERING To Skinner, questions 
OPENS US UP TO such as, Who will 
UNSCRUPULOUS CONTROL control? or Might not 
evil men use Skin­
ner's powerful technology? are irrelevant questions. In the deter­
ministic system everyone is already controlled by something in the 
environment even if he calls it self control. The only change in a 
behavioral technology is to arrange the contingencies of control, 
rather than let them operate randomly. This means that even the 
controller is controlled by his environment, which includes those he 
supposedly controls. That such countercontrol exists is Skinner's 
reassuring answer to us. 
When a person changes his physical or social environment 
"intentionally"—that is, in order to change human behavior, 
possibly including his own—he plays two roles; one as a 
controller, as the designer of a controlling culture, and another as 
the controlled, as the product of a culture. (1971, p. 197) 
To say that all control is manipulative and hence wrong is to 
overlook important uses in education, psychotherapy, govern­
ment, and elsewhere. A proposal to terminate behavioral re­
search or to sequester its results on the grounds that they can be 
used by despots and tyrants would be a disastrous mistake, be­
cause it would undermine all the important contributions of the 
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culture and interfere with the counter-controlling measures 
which keep aversive and exploitative control within bounds. 
(1974, p. 268) 
Skinner's statements about countercontrol are only meaningful 
and reassuring if determinism is true and everyone is controlled by 
evenly balanced contingencies in the environment. However, that 
is assuming that life is like a poker game in which every player 
continually has an equal number of poker chips with which to bet. 
But, as we glance around the "table" of life, that does not appear to 
be the case. Some individuals in this life, for whatever reason 
(chance, talent, environment, et al.), do seem to hold more control 
over the major reinforcements and punishments than others. Coun­
tercontrol capabilities may exist somewhere in the environment to 
control the despot, like Hitler, but millions of his citizens did not 
seem to have a handle on how to countercontrol. To say that Hitler 
was countercontrol led by the advancing Allied troops ignores the 
fact that he was more in control of German and Jewish citizens than 
they were of him. If men are not determined, then we ought to 
worry about unscrupulous control, because controllers could resist 
the influences we create in their environments and choose instead 
to exercise aversive power. 
SKINNER'S RESEARCH WITH ANIMALS Skinner is quick to 
AND SIMPLE BEHAVIORS point out that this ob-
RELATES VERY LITTLE TO THE jection is assuming 
COMPLEXITY OF HUMAN NATURE that human behavior 
is somehow different 
from animal behaviors or simple responses, which is a question for 
science to answer. In responding to this objection Skinner (1953) 
says: 
To insist upon this discontinuity at the beginning of a scientific 
investigation is to beg the question. Human behavior is distin­
guished by its complexity, its variety, and its greater accom­
plishments, but the basic processes are not therefore necessarily 
different. Science advances from the simple to the complex; it 
is constantly concerned with whether the processes and laws 
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discovered at one stage are adequate for the next. It would be 
rash to assert at this point that there is no essential difference 
between human behavior and the behavior of lower species; but 
until an attempt has been made to deal with both in the same 
terms, it would be equally rash to assert that there is. (p. 38) 
More recently Skinner (1974) writes that enough experimenta­
tion has been done to warrant holding to these initial extrapolations 
from animal behavior that he has applied to complex human be­
havior. He says, "Enough has been done to suggest that the same 
basic processes occur in both animals and men." (p. 250) 
Skinner has made a good point that if science, especially the 
science of human behavior, is to be successful, it must begin with 
the simple before analyzing the complex. And the use of animal 
subjects has a long and accepted history in psychology. The prob­
lem with this answer, however, is that one should not begin and end 
with the simple experiment. There have been operant conditioning 
experiments run on human beings, even in complex environments. 
But there have been too few of them and the connections between 
the results in the Skinner Box and the results in human experi­
mentation have been poorly made, if at all. 
Human experimentation that has not controlled for the 
subject-experimenter interactions, the past history of the subject, 
and the cognitive "behavior" of the subject cannot be safely as­
sumed to demonstrate the truth of Skinner's theories. Human 
experiments may be difficult to run and control, but Skinner has 
never seriously attempted to demonstrate his theories in complex 
human behaviors. In fact, Skinner's major views on human nature 
were written during the height of his animal experimentation and 
before much human experimentation had even been attempted. 
Also, it is not begging the question to be open to the possibility 
that humans are qualitatively different from animals. Since Skinner's 
assumptions on the identical behavioral bases for both human and 
animal behaviors seem as of yet undemonstrated by scientific 
experimentation, are they not "begging the question" just as much 
as the views of human nature that posit some radical differences 
between human and animal nature? 
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SKINNER DOES NOT LIVE AS IF 
DETERMINISM WERE TRUE. 
Skinner's basic an­
swer to these ques-
WHY DOES HE USE MENTALISTIC TERMS? tions is that what-
mined to do by his environment. If we wonder why he does some­
thing, he suggests that we study his environmental history. If we 
wonder why a man who believes that we are determined would 
ever write a book urging us to choose to do something, he responds 
that he is determined to write such a book (Skinner, 1974). 
According to the traditional definitions of self-control, happiness, 
decision, responsibility, and urging, the behaviorist is indeed 
inconsistent, but according to his own definitions he is not; and 
when the latter are understood, objections of this sort lose their 
force, (p. 272) 
To the question, "Why does Skinner even bother to write a book?" 
he responds (1974): 
To answer that question we should have to go into the history of 
the behaviorist. Nothing he says about human behavior seriously 
changes the effect of that history. His research has not altered his 
concern for his fellow men or his belief in the relevance of a 
science or technology of behavior, (pp. 272-73) 
This answer may be correct within Skinner's deterministic sys­
tem, but it is hardly a satisfying answer to those raising the objec­
tion. It is not clear what is going through the mind of Skinner as he 
writes his books. Does he consciously think of his book as a 
stimulus that will in someway change human operant behavior? Or 
do his actions reveal a belief that people are free and can change 
their behavior if urged to do so? 
To the specific objection that he uses mentalistic language in 
the very books that condemn mentalistic constructs, he writes 
(1974): 
I have used technical terms in making a technical point. I have 
preferred a technical term elsewhere when it could be used at no 
great cost. Rather than say that our problem is "to create a con­
cern for the future," I have preferred to say that it is "to induce 
WHY DOES HE WRITE A BOOK? ever he does, he 
has been deter-
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people to act with respect to a future." I prefer the expression "It 
occurred to me." But elsewhere I have freely used the lay vo­
cabulary while accepting the responsibility of providing a tech­
nical translation upon demand. There is no other way if a book of 
this kind is to be brief and readable, (pp. 271-72) 
SKINNER IGNORES ANY PSYCHOLOGY Skinner does not re-
because he rejects any attempt to theorize about physical or mental 
constructs in order to account for human behavior. He says in an 
interview with Psychology Today (Hall, 1967): 
I think the main objection to behaviorism is that people are in 
love with the mental apparatus. If you say that doesn't really 
exist, that it's a fiction and let's get back to the facts, then they 
have to give up their first love. .. . This Freudian business is 
dying out, anyway. As for the cognitive seed, that never was 
anything; they are not getting anywhere; and the operant people 
are. . . . When all their mythical machinery finally grinds to a halt 
and is laid aside, discarded, then we will see'what is remem­
bered fifty or a hundred years from now . . . you can't get results 
by sitting around and theorizing about the inner world of the 
disturbed, (p. 109) 
Skinner's rejection of most areas of psychology illustrates the 
academic isolation of his radical behaviorism. His system is so re­
strictive that it can benefit from no other kind of data or theories in 
psychology. The problem is not just that Skinner neglects cognitive 
and physiological data, but that his behaviorism offers no sufficient 
method to study such ideas in order to reject them. 
SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM Skinner insists that his behaviorism 
REPRESENTS SCIENTISM, has been more scientific than almost 
NOT SCIENCE any area of psychology. He feels that 
his emphasis on the investigation of 
basic processes with careful attention to the design and control of 
experiments is what science is all about. He says (1974): 
THAT DOES NOT 
AGREE WITH HIS SYSTEM 
spond favorably to 
other areas of psy­
chology, primarily 
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Behaviorists are sometimes accused of idolatry; they are said to 
worship science and to borrow the trappings of science simply in 
order to look scientific. . . . But it is hard to find any sign of this in 
the history of the experimental analysis of behavior. Early studies 
used simple equipment, and the data were reported as simply as 
possible. The underlying assumption that behavior was orderly 
rather than capricious could scarcely be said to have been 
adopted for honorific purposes. To establish the dimensions of 
behavior and related variables, to insist upon prediction and 
control, to use mathematics where quantification permitted— 
these were essential steps rather than window dressing, (p. 256) 
While it is true that Skinner should not be accused of operating 
unscientifically in the laboratory, that is not true about the many 
statements of "fact" that he bases on assumptions about the nature 
of reality, humankind, and knowledge rather than upon experi­
mentation. It is in these areas that Skinner's philosophical assump­
tions influence his statements and are offered as the findings of 
science rather than as one narrow philosophical perspective—here 
he can perhaps rightly be accused of scientism. 
SUMMARY In general it can be seen that there is not a lot of 
effective communication going on between Skinner 
and his critics. The communication that exists leaves neither side 
impressed by the other's arguments. This is largely due to the fact 
that Skinner and his critics are arguing from radically different 
starting assumptions about reality and human nature. Skinner's 
seeming disinterest in the kind of questions that philosophers raise is 
not due to an ignorance on his part of the philosophical arguments, 
but to his belief in the truth of his radical behaviorism. In the same 
way, some hostility to Skinner's ideas probably arises because his 
critics are inclined to reject all of his work because of his unaccept­
able philosophical framework. More meaningful dialogue would 
ensue if Skinner's critics attempted to understand his scientific 
indings and ideas in the context of their own philosophical as­
sumptions about reality and man. In the next chapter I will attempt 
to suggest some of the directions this effort could take for those 
interested in relating Skinner's work to historical Christian thought. 
n CHRISTIAN RESPONSE 
Our analysis of B. F. Skinner's research and theoretical labor 
has shown that his strong £1 points lie in his scientific 
methodology and laboratory 5# data. Skinner has made im­
mense contributions to psychology with his operant-conditioning 
paradigm and its numerous applications to animal and human 
learning. He has explored and quantified some of the ways we are 
affected by our environment; he has gone a long way toward ex­
plaining how this process works—at least in animal behavior and 
some simple human activities. The application of behavioristic 
principles to the field of clinical psychology by those who had been 
influenced by Skinner is also providing a technology to deal with a 
variety of psychological disturbances. The impact of Skinner's 
theory of human and animal behavior has without a doubt changed 
the entire field of psychology. Few other theorists in the one-
hundred-year history of psychology have contributed so much. 
On the other hand, Skinner's journeys into the realm of 
philosophical speculation on human nature seem to go far beyond 
what his data will support. His dogmatic dependence upon a single, 
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empirical method for knowing about human nature has narrowed his 
scope of understanding of the human personality on issues like 
language, freedom, dignity, and ethics. It has also left him opposing 
many respected views on human nature. In chapters 4-8, we looked 
at some of the major conflicts between Skinner's assumptions on 
human freedom and competing views, and also at some of the serious 
gaps in Skinner's theorizing. However, we have not yet directly 
addressed the question of the compatibility of Skinner's views on 
human nature with those of Christianity. In this chapter we will look 
at some of these key areas and attempt to see precisely what areas of 
compatibility and conflict exist. To do this, we will look at various 
aspects of Skinner's theories that the Bible also speaks to. 
Specifically, we will look at the biblical view of human nature, 
human freedom, and the source of value and ethics. As a foundation 
for this, we must also take a brief look at the biblical view of reality, 
including the reality of God and the nature of His revelation. 
In attempting to set forth some fundamental features of the 
Bible's views of reality and human nature, I am not attempting to 
erect a biblical psychology or to give detailed statements on the 
human personality. The Bible, in general, limits its teachings on 
human nature to brief but far-reaching descriptions concerning the 
origin and destiny of man and the relationship of man to God and 
other men. It is debatable whether a complete "biblical psychol­
ogy can be constructed from such content. While the Bible does 
not exhaust the subject of human nature, and while it does not give 
detailed or specific descriptions of how the personality functions, it 
does provide some very clear parameters and definitive statements 
that enable us to evaluate at least the broadest and most fundamen­
tal concepts of theorists like Skinner. 
THE NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE In an earlier chapter, we 
OF REALITY critiqued Skinner's strictly 
materialistic and naturalistic 
assumptions about the nature of reality. Since he sees the entire 
world (including humanity) as composed of only matter and 
operating by laws of cause and effect alone, he rules out the 
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existence of any reality other than material realities and denies the 
validity of any methods of knowing except pure empiricism. He 
writes (Skinner, 1971, 1974): 
The picture which emerges from a scientific analysis is not of a 
body with a person inside, but of a body which is a person in the 
sense that it displays a complex repertoire of behavior, (p. 190) A 
person is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a point at which 
many genetic and environmental conditions come together in a 
joint effect, (p. 185) 
In this chapter, we will examine Skinner's views of the nature of 
reality and the nature of persons to discover how well they fit with 
biblical revelation. 
The Bible stands dramatically apart from the naturalistic, mate­
rialistic pronouncements of our age to assert that God exists and that 
He is the source of all that is. The Bible opens with, "In the begin­
ning God created" (Gen. 1:1). John tells us, "In the beginning was 
the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" 
(John 1:1). God was there before there was material reality. Ac­
cording to Scripture, the Creator is not an impersonal force, but a 
personal being who has revealed Himself to humanity. The exist­
ence of a personal, creative, communicating God does not permit 
us to understand life solely in natural and material terms. Although a 
restricted, materialistic view might be helpful for the limited pur­
pose of scientific predictability, we cannot expect to fully under­
stand any part of the universe apart from both God's creative pur­
poses and continuing activity. Hebrews 1:3 aptly tells us that He 
sustains "all things by his powerful word." This is apparently a 
continuing, active sustaining of the universe. The Bible does not 
present God as the deist's absent God or a God who is there but is in 
no way involved with the natural order. Donald MacKay (1974) 
writes: 
I think, the key to the whole problem of the relation of science to 
the Christian faith, is that God, and God's activity, come in not as 
extras here and there, but everywhere. ... if the divine activity 
means anything, then all the events of what we call the physical 
world are dependent on that activity, (p. 57) 
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When the scientist discovers the laws of nature, he is not dis­
covering exceptions or alternatives to God's activity; he is simply 
describing that activity in its physical manifestations. The Christian 
view of God, in fact, does not allow us to separate the activities of 
God from the activities of nature. Consequently, the Christian has 
no quarrel with Skinner's data. Skinner has uncovered some of 
God's laws governing certain animal and human behaviors. The 
problem arises only when Skinner generalizes from his data and 
makes broad assumptions about the nature of reality that are unsup-
portable by data and in conflict with biblical revelation. At the very 
moment Skinner is attacking the "nonscientific" views and as­
sumptions of theorists who disagree with him he is operating on his 
own unprovable assumptions. As E. J. Carnell (1948) put it: 
The mistake of the modern man is that he pronounces the ben­
ediction when the scientist has spoken, not realizing that there 
are yet superhypotheses which must be made before even the 
subordinate laws of science are significant, (p. 94) 
The enigmatic situation in the modern world is that the sci­
entist rejects the Christian world-view because it involves certain 
non-empirical metaphysical hypotheses, while assuming for 
himself a truckload, each of which goes as much beyond sensory 
observation as does the Christian's postulate of the Cod Who has 
revealed Himself in Scripture. The Christian questions the sport 
of this game. Fair rules in the contest of hypothesis-making ought 
to dictate that the winner be he who can produce the best set of 
assumptions to account for the totality of reality. If the Christian is 
disqualified from the arena by rules which his opponent makes, it 
is evident that the game has been 'fixed.' Good sportsmanship, to 
say nothing of common sense, requires that in a contest, all 
participants be given the same advantages as well as the same 
handicaps. Without these conditions there is no sport, (p. 94-95) 
Rather than yielding to Skinner's attempt to baptize his 
theoretical assumptions about reality in the waters of "science," the 
Christian needs to consider the foundation of these assumptions and 
compare them to biblical ones. The Bible affirms that we can gain 
knowledge through the revelation of God as well as through 
naturalistic methods and that the combination presents a more 
a equate picture of the nature of reality. The historical position of 
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the church is that God has revealed truth about Himself and His 
creation in two ways. General revelation comprises the truths that 
God reveals through nature and history that can be grasped by the 
human intellect because as bearers of the image of God we are 
intelligent, rational beings. These truths can be grasped by scientific 
investigation, observation, logic and so on; Skinner's empirical 
findings would be considered part of general revelation. 
Special revelation, on the other hand, includes truth communi­
cated through the Bible and the person of Jesus Christ. In the study 
of human nature, we need special revelation because empirical 
investigation in this field is limited and biased by false assumptions. 
There are many truths about human nature that cannot be assessed 
by scientific methods or deduced by our logic. Such things as man's 
immaterial nature (if it exists!), life after death, purpose in life, and 
ethical absolutes cannot be investigated adequately through strict 
empiricism or rationalism. The special revelation of Scripture treats 
many of these questions that are not within the range of empirical 
science and, consequently, adds immeasurably to our understand­
ing of human nature. Both science, which studies the universe God 
created (general revelation), and the data of Scripture (special reve­
lation) provide a view of the nature of reality and a broader access 
to truth—especially about the human personality. 
Psychologists who like Skinner have no belief in a Creator have 
a limited source for fully understanding personality and recognizing 
the distinctions between mankind and the animal world. They reject 
the humanity's distinctive creation in the image of God. 
Skinner apparently holds tenaciously to a view that makes man 
a biological machine and it is difficult for him to see personal man 
as the exception in a nonpersonal, material universe. That would 
limit the applicability of his research and consequently humanity's 
efforts to control its own destiny. Skinner sees his rejection of man 
as a personal, self-directing species as freeing us for future growth 
and development. In reality it does precisely the opposite. By so 
limiting his focus on sources of knowledge to empirical methods, 
Skinner actually binds the study of the person to a narrow and 
restrictive band of functions, and leaves untouched the essential 
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uniqueness of humanity. In "freeing" the science of psychology to 
use only empirical methods for the study of observable behavior he 
would actually bind us from the study of the areas of personality that 
are most distinctively human! 
The Bible, as revelation from God, is a source that makes it 
possible for Christians to study more successfully what has to be the 
most complicated subject matter in the universe—human nature. It 
has been said that the mysteries of the brain alone rival the com­
plexity of any other phenomenon in the universe. Indeed, in order 
to learn more about the intricacies of our whole beings, we will 
need a method of knowing that is capable of seeing beyond the 
limited range of empiricism—one that can give us a complete pic­
ture of man. Only from the perspective of the Creator Himself can 
the deepest questions in human life be answered. 
THE QUESTION OF Skinner's detailed studies on operant con-
HUMAN NATURE ditioning have emphasized how closely 
human behavior is tied to reinforcements in 
the environment; they have helped to demonstrate that the human 
mind is not an independent entity, but is influenced, sometimes 
rather strongly, by the bodily states of a person. With this, the Chris­
tian has no problem. Skinner's radical behaviorism, however, and 
his reductionism teach that thinking, willing, and feeling are noth­
ing more than physiology interacting with the environment. His 
view runs counter to the Christian perspective of the person as being 
endowed with an immaterial essence that relates to, but is not con­
trolled by, the material body. 
It is difficult to summarize the biblical view of human nature 
since it would undoubtedly fill many volumes. There are a few 
features, however, of the biblical doctrine of man that are espe­
cially relevant to Skinner's view of human nature. The impression 
the Bible gives us concerning humanity is in conflict with Skinner's 
behaviorism in that man has central position in the whole of 
reality. Humanity is the peak of creation and the object of divine 
love. Our supreme value is that we are children of God who can 
possess a dynamic, intimate relationship with the Creator. The 
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teaching and actions of Jesus emphasize the worth of man; the 
Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath (Mark 10:31). 
Man is more valuable than the animals (Matt. 10:31, Luke 12:7; 
Matt. 12:12), and man's eternal soul is of more worth than any­
thing in this world. 
Another prominent feature of the biblical view of human nature 
is that man is not an isolated, self-explained being. In fact, Scripture 
emphasizes that man cannot be understood or explained aside from 
his relationship to God. G. C. Berkhouwer (1962) explains: 
We cannot understand "man" apart from his relation to God. 
Man would then be, from a scriptural viewpoint, nothing but an 
abstraction, and if we seek to define man merely in terms of 
various qualities and abilities, we are not giving a biblical picture 
of man. (p. 93) 
This means that while we may learn much about man with 
empirical methods, those methods can never disclose the total 
reality of man's essence. Man's whole being is dominated by the 
fact that he was created to enter into, and live out a loving, depend­
ent, and obedient relationship with God. Jeremiah 10:23 tells us 
that a man's life is not his own. The mystery of personality is bound 
up with dependence on and interaction with the Creator. 
Since mankind was created to know God and to commune 
with Him, it stands to reason that God would make human nature 
capable of a personal relationship with Himself. There are limita­
tions to bodily existence (Gen. 2:7-3:19), but the Bible also teaches 
that human beings are a special creation made similar to God. 
While much debate surrounds the precise meaning of the image of 
God in man, we can safely assume that this image and likeness 
relates to the personality of man. As persons we are agents of our 
own behavior. We are creative, rational, moral, and social beings. 
And most importantly, we stand apart from the animals in our ca­
pacity for a deep and intimate relationship with God. 
The Bible also emphasizes the essential unity of human nature. 
Genesis 2:7 describes human life as the unity of the physical and 
spiritual. "And the LORD God formed man from the dust of the 
ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man 
112 • B. F. SKINNER'S BEHAVIORISM 
became a living being." This holistic view of human nature is im­
portant when evaluating Skinner's behaviorism. Human nature, 
while intricately physical, is not merely biological. On the other 
hand, in emphasizing the existence of personality, we must not 
divorce mental life from the body and thereby ignore the environ­
mental influences upon human nature. 
Another relevant aspect of the biblical view of human nature is 
the fall into sin. According to Scripture, the first human pair rebelled 
against God and threw the entire human race into alienation from 
the Creator and from each other. Although this fall did not destroy 
the image of God in man it did seriously distort it. Man lost com­
munion with God and the inclination to God's will; there was no 
possibility for self-recovery. According to Scripture, all of human­
ity's problems—physical, social, and psychological—can ulti­
mately be traced to this spiritual alienation and the excessive self-
centeredness caused by the Fall. 
The five elements of the biblical view of humanity we have just 
surveyed (the central position of man in God's created order, the 
impossibility of understanding man apart from his relationship with 
his creator, the essential differentiation of man from the animal 
kingdom, the holistic view of the nature of persons, and humanity's 
sinfulness) are in agreement with many psychological observations 
of humanity. Man towers above the animal world in his reason, 
morality, emotional expression, culture building, and person-social 
relationships. In contrast, Skinner attempts to attribute the entire 
range of humanity's ability, potential, and creative genius to simply 
the physical and environmental realms. His view does not accord 
with these broad, biblical observations. The Christian view, which 
sees our uniqueness as originating from and relating to the God of 
the universe, seems much more consistent with the amazing 
achievements and potentials so apparent in human nature. Al­
though relating humanity's genius to the creative activity of God is 
not provable by the methods of science, it is no less provable than 
Skinner's naturalistic and materialistic assumptions, and it appears 
to be at least as capable (if not more so) of explaining the unique 
phenomena of human nature. 
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In addition to fitting more naturally with our observations of the 
fundamental differences between humans and animals, the biblical 
view of human nature, which stresses humanity's relationship to 
God, provides a firm basis for identity and self-worth. Skinner's 
behaviorism can only provide a fragile foundation for self-esteem 
based on arbitrary pronouncements of self-worth in a cold universe 
in contrast to the living, dynamic foundation for self-esteem that 
grows out of viewing man as a creation of the living God! 
The biblical emphasis on the unity of man's nature is also in 
agreement with neurophysiological studies, which show a very 
close relationship between brain activity and human functioning. If 
man is a unified being, we cannot understand human nature as 
simply a summation of various parts. We must be alert to a dynamic 
interaction of the whole person with the environment. 
The Christian view of the Fall (and potential redemption) al­
lows us to look more deeply at the source of humanity's emotional, 
behavioral, and social problems than if we attended simply to 
environmental factors. Although a discussion of the causes of psy­
chological maladjustment is beyond the scope of this book, Skin­
ner's concept of the person as a blank slate that is shaped toward 
goodness or badness by the environment simply does not account 
for the perversity of human nature as well as the biblical view. 
While recognizing these environmental influences, the Christian 
view also attends to the basic propensity of humans to respond in 
selfish and self-defeating ways. The Christian concept of sin pro­
vides this balancing frame of reference. 
THE QUESTION OF The determinism of human nature as taught 
FREEDOM by Skinner springs ultimately from his de­
nial of the uniqueness of the human per­
sonality. The biblical concept of human freedom flows logically 
from the view of humanity as a bearer of the image of God. It seems 
clear that the Bible teaches the essential freedom of human nature. 
The Old and New Testaments are filled with God's requirements for 
human behavior. God holds human beings responsible for their 
actions and expects them to correct sinful behavior. God also 
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clearly desires that His love toward humanity will be returned. In 
fact, the whole drama of sin and evil, beginning in the garden of 
Eden and continuing until this day, implies that something has gone 
wrong in God's universe. God created human beings with the free­
dom to act counter to His will. 
While Skinner's research has uncovered a basic lawfulness re­
lating human and animal behavior to the environment, these factors 
do not destroy freedom any more than our basic sinfulness destroys 
our ability to be responsible. If we use the term influence instead of 
determinism, Skinner's contributions (and those of many other be­
havioral psychologists) can be placed in a more realistic perspec­
tive. The Bible makes it clear that human beings influence each 
other (Prov. 22:6), and the view of an "influencing" environment 
also allows for the existence of freedom (freedom does not have to 
mean choices without influence). There can be little doubt that 
everything we are, is at least in part a product of the environment in 
which we exist, but this does not destroy human freedom, it simply 
balances it and puts it in perspective. We live in a complex universe 
ordered by God in which we have the power to make willful 
choices that impact both our lives and the lives of others. There is a 
balance between individual freedom to choose (which we all have) 
and the influences of others upon our choices. 
This biblical view of man's freedom does not assert that free 
actions are capricious, uncaused happenings, that are unrelated to 
either one's past history or environmental influences. It suggests 
instead that free behavior is ultimately caused by the person himself 
in the context of these other variables. These other variables are a 
necessary part of the explanation of human behavior since human 
nature is not separate from the natural order. Such variables, how­
ever, are not a sufficient explanation. Evans (1977) speaks about 
freedom of man within the natural order. 
He becomes what he becomes in the context of these social roles 
which tremendously limit and weight his options as an agent. 
Nevertheless, as a rational, responsible agent, he is not merely 
formed by these social relationships; he acts and by acting helps 
to form these roles in turn. He is not only constituted by these 
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relationships; he himself consitutes them. He plays a role in 
continuing them, modifying them for better or worse, enhancing 
or degrading their quality and character (p. 145). 
The importance of a belief in the freedom of human nature 
cannot be overemphasized when it comes to using psychology to 
help solve humanities' personal and social problems. In our design 
of counseling methods or social programs, believing in human free­
dom forces us to draw upon the powerful resources of the individual 
for change (these resources that remain of limited interest to the 
radical behaviorist). Our belief in human freedom does not deny the 
influence of the environment on man, but because we believe in 
freedom we can strive to help a person gain control over his envi­
ronment. Believing in both human freedom and the strong 
influences of the environment allows us to retain a view of human 
responsibility and dignity and at the same time not lose our compas­
sion for those who have been tremendously handicapped by severe 
environmental circumstances and therefore used less of the poten­
tial freedom. 
THE QUESTION OF One cannot read Walden Two, Skin-
VALUE AND CONTROL ner's Utopian novel, without being 
impressed by his desire to apply 
his theory to the severe problems faced by the world. Skinner has 
emphasized what we all should agree to—that human problems 
today are almost out of control and something needs to be done to 
help people lead productive, happy lives. Skinner is also optimistic 
enough to believe that our problems can be solved. As we saw in 
Chapter 7, however, even if Skinner's methodology could be 
applied in the optimistic manner Walden Two envisions, it would 
fail to provide any meaningful direction and source of value for the 
changes taking place. Thus, even its potential value for change in 
the culture becomes immediately suspect. 
In contrast to Skinner's Utopia, the Christian has a solid basis for 
assigning worth to a particular behavior or direction in science 
because the Bible contains both ethical absolutes and general prin­
ciples that can guide behavior. The Christian ethic, rather t an 
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being the result of arbitrary human decisions, is anchored firmly in 
the unchanging nature of a Cod of perfect love and justice. This 
does not mean that the Christian ethic is based upon the arbitrary 
will of a supreme being; its basis is the unchanging character of 
Cod. Christian theologians Geisler and Feinberg (1980) for exam­
ple, assert, "If God is all-good and all-knowing as the Christian 
believes, then He and He alone is in the best position to declare 
what is valuable and what is not valuable for finite creatures 
(p. 367). 
The Christian ethic is superior to Skinner's natural ethic be­
cause it has its basis in the unchanging character of God. Skinner 
can only point to what men seem to be doing successfully and claim 
that this is a "natural law" in their behavior. Actually, what men 
believe ought to be done or how they would like to be treated is 
frequently closer to the natural law in man than is his behavior! 
With God as the source of direction the Christian has a perfect and 
loving center of reference whereas Skinner can only rely on the 
natural inclinations of imperfect men as the source of guidance and 
value. 
The Christian view of change in society also offers a superior 
motivation than Skinner's reinforcement theory. Since man is a free 
person, he is challenged by God to do right and love his neighbor 
because God has commanded it. Furthermore, he is assured con­
tinually in the Bible (Pss. 1, 19, 119; Prov. 1-9) that the doing of 
right will result in blessings. The Christian has hope for a better 
world, not because his environment will change, but because he 
has experienced a spiritual rebirth that deeply impacts his basic 
self-centered propensity. In relationship with God the believer not 
only knows the good, but has a new motivation to pursue it. 
CONCLUSION In conclusion, it can be seen that biblical revela­
tion is compatible with the data Skinner has 
gathered and that the data is consistent with an ordered universe 
created by God. Skinner's findings are a part of our understanding of 
God's general revelation, and as such are an important part of our 
understanding of human nature. This same biblical revelation, 
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however, is opposed to Skinner's total determinism, narrow empiri­
cism, and naturalistically-based value system. As Christians we 
should feel free to utilize the findings of Skinner's science in a range 
of clinical applications. We should not delude ourselves, however, 
into thinking that his learning paradigm is a fully complete or accu­
rate presentation of the dynamic operations of personality. As Jeeves 
(1976) put it: 
I must distinguish carefully between Skinner's scientific contri­
bution and his speculative writings. It is in the latter that he freely 
imports his own values, beliefs, hopes and fears, but this impor­
tation should not detract from the importance of the former. 
(p. 61) 
So long as Skinner's model is evaluated on its merits as a 
contribution to our techniques for shaping and maintaining be­
havior there is not conflict with Christian beliefs. Conflicts arise 
when unjustified extrapolations are made, such as that, because 
aspects of animal and human behavior can be manipulated using 
their techniques man is therefore 'nothing but' a stimulus-
response machine, (p. 62) 
As should be apparent from the relative lack of emphasis on the 
specific clinical applications of Skinner's behaviorism, our analysis 
of Skinner was not designed primarily to answer questions about the 
use of behavior modification techniques for weight control, reduc­
ing smoking, or stimulating more assertive behavior. Given the 
Christian understanding of general revelation and the fact that all 
truth is God's truth, we should not hesitate to utilize workable prin­
ciples that are consistent with biblical revelation. Our goal in this 
volume has been to challenge some of Skinner's assumptions; this is 
part of a larger issue that is signaled by the tendency of some scien­
tists to deny the unique personhood of human beings. 
It is perhaps strange that Skinner and other scientists who attack 
the concept of personhood trace their academic roots back to the 
age of humanism. Then, as now, it was man in all his glory who sent 
noble reason around the globe to search out and conquer all the 
mysteries of nature and lay them at humanity's feet. Then came the 
day when many of these mysteries of nature were unveiled and man 
was left with nothing more to conquer except his reason and 
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himself. Having finally conquered these he joined the ignoble ranks 
of molecule and rat. The optimistic search for truth ended with a 
loss of truth; exalted man ended up in a Skinnerian box of his own 
construction! 
And yet it is not so strange. Without a larger source for under­
standing man than nature, a piece of nature he must be. Let us visit 
briefly with C. S. Lewis (1947) on this concluding thought. 
From this point of view the conquest of Nature appears in a new 
light. We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may 
"conquer" them. We are always conquering Nature, because 
"Nature" is the name for what we have, to some extent, con­
quered. The price of conquest is to treat a thing as mere Nature. 
Every conquest over Nature increases her domain. The stars do 
not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them; the soul 
does not become Nature till we can psychoanalyze her. The 
wresting of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things 
to Nature. As long as this process stops short of the final stage we 
may well hold that the gain outweighs the loss. But as soon as we 
take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of 
mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the 
being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed 
are one and the same. . . . (pp. 82-84) 
But surely it is not yet too late to argue for a view of humankind that 
befits its magnificant nature, which at times manifests itself in ways 
that can easily be understood according to simple laws of learning, 
and at other times manifests itself in complex ways that defy these 
naturalistic observations! 
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